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The Law of the World Trade Organization and
the Communications Law of the European
Community: On a Path of Harmony or Discord?
Mira BURRI NENOVA*
This article presents an overview of the law of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) relevant to telecommunications services and correlates this body of law with
the current regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and
services in the European Community (EC). The latter has been adapted to meet the
challenges of technological and market developments in communications,
epitomized by the processes of digitization, enhanced transport networks and
convergence. The novel solutions embodied in the EC electronic communications
regime, notably, a new design of the Significant Market Power mechanism, a
projected withdrawal of sector specific regulation and an affirmation of the principle
of technological neutrality, pose interesting questions as to the conformity of this
reformed EC communications law with the WTO rules on telecommunications
services and the obligations of the European Communities and their Member States.
Looking beyond the WTO legal compatibility test, essential questions regarding the
need for evolution of the WTO telecommunications rules are raised. The present
paper contributes to the ongoing debate in that context in light of the EC
experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Telecommunications are in essence a transnational technology.1 Since the
invention of the telegraph and telephone (in 1844 and 1876, respectively), their
function as a means of communication and transport of information has barely been
limited to national boundaries.2 Indeed, looking back, it appears that the goal of
* Mira Burri Nenova, dr.iur., MAES, is the alternate leader of the research project ``eDiversity: The Legal
Protection of Cultural Diversity in a Digital Networked Environment'', which is an integral part of the Swiss
National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) ``Trade Regulation'', supported by the Swiss National
Science Foundation (<www.nccr-trade.org>). Mira is also a member of i-call (International Communications and
Art Law Lucerne) centre of the University of Lucerne (<www.i-call.ch>). E-mail: <mira.nenova@wti.org>.
1 Ian Walden, ``The International Regulatory Regime'', in Ian Walden and John Angel (eds),
Telecommunications Law (London: Blackstone, 2001), p. 346.
2 A good overview of the early discoveries and developments in the telecommunications sector is provided by
David Gillies and Roger Marshall, Telecommunications Law, Vol. 1 (2nd edn, London: Butterworths LexisNexis,
2003), pp. 2±3.
Journal of World Trade 41(4): 833±878, 2007.
# 2007 Kluwer Law International. Printed in The Netherlands.
innovators has always been to provide a connection between rather than within
countries.3 The current process of digitization, which renders all types of data, be it
audio, text, still or moving images, expressible in a line of zeros and ones and the
emergence of sophisticated fibre-optic networks make this transnational nature of
telecommunications even more pronounced. Beyond the level of technology, at the
level of markets and economic transactions, globalization has significantly intensified
the use of these networks, while also increasing their value and importance.
From a legal perspective, the transnational nature of telecommunications has
demanded considerable coordination and cooperation between countries, which has
been mirrored in their regulation at the international level. Clear proof of the need for
cooperation is the fact that the first intergovernmental organization, the International
Telegraph Union, was founded in 1865 specifically to address it.4 Subsequently,
numerous telecommunications-relevant treaties and conventions under public
international law and less formal agreements have come into being, dealing with the
treatment and use of common natural resources, standardization and development.5
The communications industry is, however, not static. Indeed, the technological
developments of the last three decades, epitomized above all by the above-mentioned
digitization and enhancement of networks, have utterly transformed its characteristics
and mechanisms.6 The dynamics of communications technologies and the newly
realized potential of the telecommunications sector and its contribution to economic
growth7 induced a change in the regulatory paradigm for telecom networks and
services. At the national level, this triggered the processes of liberalization and re-
regulation of telecommunications markets. These developments have had natural
3 It was as early as 1891 when the first submarine telephone cable was laid between England and France. It
was operated by the Central Telegraph Office in London and enabled telephone conversations between specially
equipped booths in London and Paris. The first transatlantic telephone call was made in 1915 and connected
Virginia and Paris but was only experimental. In 1926, Bell Laboratories and the British Post Office engineered the
first transatlantic two-way communication.
4 The International Telegraph Union was transformed into the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) in 1932 (combining the International Telegraph Convention of 1865 and the International Radiotelegraph
Convention of 1906). In 1947, the ITU became a specialized agency of the United Nations and almost all
sovereign countries are members (currently 189 members). The ITU's principal function is to promote the
efficient use of telecommunications services and to harmonize national interests. It is further responsible for the
international coordination of the use of the radio spectrum (including for non-telecommunications purposes such
as broadcasting, navigation and radar). On the ITU, see Walden, as note 1 above, pp. 346±369; Christian Koenig
and Jens-Daniel Braun, ``The International Regulatory Framework of EC Telecommunications Law: The Law of
the WTO and the ITU as a Yardstick for EC Law'', in Christian Koenig, Andreas Bartosch and Jens-Daniel Braun
(eds), EC Competition and Telecommunications Law (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International,
2002), pp. 19±49; Bobjoseph Mathew, The WTO Agreements on Telecommunications (Berne, Frankfurt and Brussels:
Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 29±40.
5 Walden, as note 1 above, at pp. 348 et seq.
6 For an analysis of the technological developments in telecommunications and on dynamism as an intrinsic
characteristic of communications markets, see Mira Nenova, EC Electronic Communications: Can Competition Law
Do It All? Burri Nenova, EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law (London: Cameron May 2007),
at ch. 1.
7 See, e.g., European Commission, Green Paper on the development of the common market for
telecommunications services and equipment: Towards a dynamic European economy, COM(1987) 290 final, 30
June 1987. The 11th EC Communications Report (European Commission, European electronic communications
regulation and markets 2005, COM(2006) 68 final, 20 February 2006, p. 2) shows that the market was worth C= 273
billion in 2005 and the overall revenue growth continued strong at levels of between 3.8 and 4.7 percent.
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repercussions for the global regulatory environment as well. As elements of these
repercussions, the negotiating and standard-making processes and ultimately, the
``classical'' sources of international telecommunications law have been reshaped.
Two important changes have occurred in this context. First, a new cluster of
stakeholders corresponding to the shift in market structures emerged, thereby
increasing the significance of market players in the decision-making processes (as
opposed to Nation-States as decision-makers).8 Second, and perhaps more importantly,
there was a shift in the regulatory mandate for telecommunications. Because of their
increased significance in a globalized networked environment, they needed to be
properly addressed ``as a distinct economic activity, a tradable service, rather than
simply as a medium or a conduit for conducting trade''.9 The issue of market access as
the emerging primary concern in international communications law could not be
tackled appropriately in the realm of the ITU. WTO, in contrast, provided an apposite
negotiations and regulatory forum10 and, as we shall see below, comprehensively
addressed different issues of communications markets' regulation, while also affirming
the liberalization trend as a sound approach to telecommunications policy.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the multitude of bodies regulating in
the field of communications on the regional and global levels, or to discuss their
documents and intricate relationships.11 This article seeks rather to explore the
relationship between the law of the WTO and the European Community regulation as
far as it relates to telecommunications services. Such an analysis is needed for (at least)
three reasons.
First, because the EC communications law has changed. The 2002 framework for
electronic communications networks and services is a novel regulatory model that
attempts to respond to the most recent (and prepare for future) technological and
market developments in communications. As such, it is crucial to know whether it and
its 2007 update still fit harmoniously into the global regulatory model provided by the
WTO.
8 An example in point is the formation of a number of new standard-setting organizations. See, in that regard,
Alan Cunningham, ``Telecommunications, Intellectual Property, and Standards'', in Ian Walden and John Angel
(eds), Telecommunications Law and Regulation (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 370 et seq.
See, generally, Wybo P. Heere (ed.), From Government to Governance: The Growing Impact of Non-State
Actors on the International and European Legal System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2004.
9 Walden, as note 1 above, p. 347.
10 On the reasons for the choice of the WTO as a more suitable forum for telecommunications negotiations,
see Marco C.E.J. Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, Telecommunications Services and the World Trade Organization, 31
Journal of World Trade 5 (October 1997), pp. 6±7; Christoph Beat Graber, Handel und Kultur im Audiovisionsrecht
der WTO. VoÈlkerrechtliche, oÈkonomische und kulturpolitische Grundlagen einer globalen Medienordnung (Berne: Staempfli,
2003), pp. 198±199.
11 For an overview of the international regulatory authorities in the field of telecommunications, see Gillies
and Marshall, as note 2 above, pp. 147±153. See also Charles H. Kennedy and M. Veronica Pastor, An Introduction
to International Telecommunications Law (Boston and London: Artech House, 1996); Denis Campbell, International
Telecommunications Law (London: BNA International, 1999); Colin D. Long (ed.), Global Telecommunications Law
and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001±04).
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Second, and in more concrete terms, because WTO law is binding12 upon the
European Communities and their Member States as signatories to the WTO
Agreements,13 it is necessary to explore whether the evolution of the EC
communications rules may lead to a breach of the obligations of the Communities.
Third, and finally, considering the staggering speed of the development of
communications and the far-reaching processes of digitization and convergence, it is
interesting (and important) to contemplate the design of an adequate multi-layered
regulatory model for the communications sector. As a contribution to this wide-
ranging discussion (which cannot be dealt with exhaustively here), this article provides
some thoughts on the adequacy of the current WTO communications rules by
comparing them to the more advanced model of EC electronic communications law.
Taking into account that the WTO is emerging as the most significant international
forum, these thoughts may be valuable for the future shaping of the WTO and EC
communications regimes, and generally, for the future development of the
communications industry as essentially transnational.
This article addresses the above issues in four parts. The first part provides an
overview of the WTO instruments relevant to telecommunications services. The
second briefly explores the effects of WTO law on the EC legal order and the EC
commitments for telecommunications services. The third part analyses the relationship
between the communications rules of the European Community and their WTO
counterparts and seeks to establish whether they form a harmonious or rather a
discordant pair. Section IV provides the conclusions and a few speculations on the
future.
II. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The WTO was established in April 1994 as part of the final act embodying the
results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations14 and building upon
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947.15 It became operational on
1 January 1995 and over the past ten years has grown to be the most influential
organization on a global level, regulating not only trade in goods, services and trade-
12 On the legal effect of WTO law upon the EC legal order, see section III.A. below.
13 See Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994, concerning the conclusion on behalf of the
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay
Round multilateral negotiations (1986±94), OJ L 336/191, 23 December 1994 and Council Decision 97/838/EC
concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the
results of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications services, OJ L 347/45, 18 December 1997.
14 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization with Understanding on the Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes and Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, TS
57(1996) Cm 3277; (1994) 33 ILM 15, entered into force 1 January 1995 (hereinafter the WTO Agreement).
15 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana 1947 (entered into force 1 January 1948; subsequently
rectified, amended, or modified by the terms of legal instruments, which had entered into force before the date of
entry into force of the WTO Agreement).
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related aspects of intellectual property rights but also broader issues.16 As stated in
Article III of the founding Marrakesh Agreement, the functions of the WTO are, inter
alia: (i) to facilitate the implementation, administration and operation of the adopted
multilateral trade agreements;17 (ii) to provide a forum for negotiations among its
Members and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations;18
and (iii) to administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).19 This dispute settlement mechanism, with the
authority to enforce the obligations accepted by the Members under the covered
agreements, is a unique feature of the WTO and one that has contributed substantially
to its positioning at the forefront of intergovernmental organizations.20
The law of the WTO is contained in multiple agreements (attached as annexes to
the WTO Agreement)21 that can be structured into three main pillars, namely: the
GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). While the GATT
applies to telecommunications equipment and the TRIPs Agreement to certain aspects
of communications activities related to intellectual property, the WTO instrument
most immediately relevant for communications is the GATS.22
A. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), similarly to the GATT,23 is
aimed at protecting equality of competitive opportunities for companies in domestic
markets, regardless of their origin and the origin of their services, and at facilitating the
16 For an introduction to the law of the WTO and its most important tenets, see, e.g., John H. Jackson, The
World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (2nd edn, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1999); Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation (Berne: Staempfli, and London:
Cameron May, 2004); Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
17 Article III:1 of the WTO Agreement.
18 Article III:2 of the WTO Agreement.
19 Article III:2 of the WTO Agreement. See also Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
20 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed.), The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement SystemÐInternational Law,
International Organizations and Dispute Settlement (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International,
1997); James Cameron and Karen Campbell (eds), Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization (London:
Cameron May, 1998); Thomas Cottier, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Characteristics and
Structural Implications for the European Union, 35 Common Market Law Review (1998), 325±378.
21 As stated in Article II:2 of the WTO Agreement, `` . . the agreement and associated legal instruments
included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 . . are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members''.
22 One should however note that the delineation between services and goods is not always clear. As the
European Court of Justice stated, `` . . in the field of telecommunications, . . it is difficult to determine generally
whether it is free movement of goods or freedom to provide services which would take priority''. ``Accordingly,
the question . . must be examined simultaneously in the light of both Article 30 and Article 59 of the Treaty''. See
Case C-390/99, Canal SateÂlite Digital SL v. AdministracioÂn General del Estado, and Distribuidora de TelevisioÂn Digital SA
(DTS) [2002] ECR I-607, at paras 32±33. On the debate concerning the application of GATT or GATS, see
David Luff, Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services: Considerations for a Convergence Policy at the World Trade
Organization Level, 38 Journal of World Trade 6 (December 2004), 1073 et seq.
23 In contrast to the GATT, which builds upon the GATT 1947, the GATS is a completely new Agreement
for the field of services negotiated during the Uruguay Round (1986±94).
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progressive liberalization of these markets. The approach and structure of the GATS,
however, differ from those of the GATT, since the object of regulation, that is services,
is essentially different from goods.
Part II of the GATS comprises a number of fundamental ``General Obligations and
Disciplines'' which apply to all ``measures by Members which affect trade in services'',24
with the notable exception of those ``supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority''.25 The core of these general obligations is the most-favoured-nation (MFN)
obligation, formulated in Article II:1 GATS. Pursuant to the latter, each Member is
obliged to ``accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like service and
service suppliers of any other country''. As established through the case-law, the MFN
treatment implies a prohibition of de facto, as well as de jure discrimination between like
foreign services and service suppliers.26
In contrast to the GATT,27 however, where the MFN principle bears no
individual exemptions, the GATS has a more flexible approach.28 Thereby, each
Member may specify that the MFN would not be applicable to certain measures,
provided that those are listed in and meet the conditions of the Annex on Article II
Exemptions (the so-called ``opt-out'' approach).29 The application of this opting-out
was nonetheless limited and exemptions were allowed only until the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement, that is, 1 January 1995.30 They were further subject to
review after a five-year period31 and in principle, should not have exceeded a total
duration of ten years.32
24 See Article I:1. See also I:2 and I:3 GATS. On the interpretation of these, see Appellate Body Report,
European CommunitiesÐRegime for the Importations, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September
1997; and Appellate Body Report, CanadaÐCertain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R,
WT/DS142/AB/R, 31 May 2000.
25 See Article I:3(b) GATS. The following para. (c) clarifies that, ```a service supplied in the exercise of
governmental authority' means any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition
with one or more service suppliers''. For an interpretation, see Markus Krajewski, Public Services and Trade
Liberalization: Mapping the Legal Framework, 6 Journal of International Economic Law 2 (2003), 347 et seq.; Eric H.
Leroux, What Is a ``Service Supplied in the Exercise of Governmental Authority'' Under Article I:3(b) and (c) of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 40 Journal of World Trade 3 (June 2006), 345±385.
26 See Appellate Body Report, ECÐBananas, as note 24 above, para. 234. For further analysis, see Cottier
and Oesch, as note 16 above, pp. 355 et seq. and 829 et seq.
27 Cottier and Oesch, as note 16 above, pp. 346 et seq.
28 Christoph Beat Graber, ``Audio-Visual Policy: The Stumbling Block of Trade Liberalization'', in Damien
Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 200 et seq.
29 See Article II:2 GATS. Exemptions concerning telecommunications services (mostly on accounting rates)
have been made, inter alia, by Argentina (Doc. GATS EL/4); Bangladesh (Doc. GATS EL/8); Brazil (Doc. GATS
EL/13/Suppl. 1); India (Doc. GATS EL/42/Suppl. 1); Pakistan (Doc. GATS EL/67/Suppl. 1); Turkey (Doc. GATS
EL/79) and the United States (Doc. GATS EL/90/Suppl. 2). The EC has listed none.
30 Members can now only exempt a measure from the application of the MFN treatment under Article II:1
GATS by obtaining a waiver pursuant to Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement (see Annex on Article Exemptions,
at para. 2).
31 Annex on Article II Exemptions, at paras 3±4.
32 Annex on Article II Exemptions, at para. 6. All exemptions granted should have thus ended in January
2005. This did not however happen. In fact, many Members have explicitly stated in their exemption lists that
particular exemptions would last more than ten years.
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The general GATS obligations, as formulated in Part II, 33 are supplemented by
specific commitments accepted by individual Members in the so-called ``Schedules of
Specific Commitments'' appended to the GATS. These schedules show the positive
commitments (``opting-in'') of a Member with regard to national treatment34 and
market access35 according to the modes of supply identified in Article I GATS,36 and
the conditions, terms and limitations of these commitments.37 In practice, the
schedules represent a codification of the conditions in a specific national market upon
which a foreign service provider can rely in addition to the general obligations. They
also constitute the basis for further negotiations.38 A Member can modify or withdraw a
commitment only after a three-year period from the date it entered into force and as a
modifying Member has to bear the consequences of the modification undertaken.39
Members may further negotiate additional commitments40 with respect to
measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Article XVI
GATS (market access) or Article XVII GATS (national treatment), regarding, for
instance, qualifications, standards or licensing matters.41 Such specific commitments are
33 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss all GATS provisions that have an influence on
telecommunications services, such as domestic regulation, government procurement and public monopolies. For
comprehensive analyses, see Michael H. Ryan, Trade in Telecommunications Services: A Guide to the GATS, 3
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review (1997), 95±104; Mark Clough, Trade and Telecommunications
(London: Cameron May, 2002), pp. 31 et seq.; David Luff, ``Current International Trade Rules Relevant to
Telecommunications Services'', in Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in
Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 34±42; Marco
C.E.J. Bronckers and Pierre Larouche, ``The WTO Regime for Telecommunications Services'', in Marco C.E.J.
Bronckers and Gary N. Horlick (eds), WTO Jurisprudence and Policy: Practitioners' Perspectives (London: Cameron
May, 2004), pp. 553 et seq.
34 The ``national treatment'' obligation, articulated in Article XVII GATS, prescribes that, ``each Member
shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
service, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers''. Although
only a specific commitment under GATS, the meaning of ``national treatment'' remains the same as under GATT.
See Appellate Body Report, ECÐBananas, as note 24 above, at para. 241.
35 ``Market access'' is articulated in Article XVI GATS. Pursuant to the latter, the commitments for access
made by a Member are to be applied on an MFN basis subject to the terms, limitations and conditions specified in
its Schedule. In addition, in sectors where a Member has committed itself, it must refrain from adopting or
maintaining (unless otherwise specified in the Schedule) six particular types of measures. These are defined in litera
(a) through (f) of Article XVI:2 and encompass: (a) limitations on the number of service suppliers; (b) limitations
on the total value of service transactions or assets; (c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the
total quantity of service output; (d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture; and (f) limitations on foreign
capital participation.
36 The modes of supply of a service are: (a) from a territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member (cross-border mode); (b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member
(consumption abroad mode); (c) by a service supplier of one Member through commercial presence in the territory
of any other Member (commercial presence mode); and (d) by a service supplier in one Member, through presence
of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member (presence of natural persons mode).
37 Pursuant to Article XX GATS, each schedule specifies: (i) terms, limitations and conditions of market
access; (ii) conditions and qualifications on national treatment; (iii) undertakings relating to additional
commitments; (iv) where appropriate, the time-frame for implementation of such commitments; and (v) the
date of entry into force of such commitments.
38 Article XIX:4 GATS.
39 Article XXI GATS.
40 See note 37 above.
41 Article XVIII GATS.
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notably those made under the Reference Paper on basic telecommunications services
that is examined below.42
A characteristic of all of the provisions outlined above is that they apply across the
board to all service sectors43 and by their nature are not specifically targeted at
telecommunications (although the commitments made by a Member in its schedule are
essentially sector-based). Within the law of the WTO, there are, however, also some
specific instruments on telecommunications that, building upon the principles of
GATS, create a fairly comprehensive system of international communications rules.
They allowed for more far-reaching and finely tuned commitments, which, on the one
hand, proves the importance of telecommunications markets and on the other hand,
supports our initial thesis of the need for enhanced cooperation in telecommunications.
Before examining the telecommunications specific WTO Agreements, a brief note
of clarification is needed. This clarification concerns the categorization of
telecommunications services into basic or value-added, which runs through all
communications related provisions of the WTO and defined (and still does) the process
of negotiation and committing in the field of telecommunications services.
The distinction between basic and value-added telecommunications services does
not originate in the WTO negotiations themselves but rather from US
telecommunications law. It can be traced back to the so-called Computer Inquiries,44
when the division was instrumental in delineating the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).45 Therein, basic services were defined as ``. . .
the offering of transmission capacity for the movement of information'', while
enhanced (or value-added) services were identified as ``any offering over the
telecommunications network which is more than a basic transmission service''.46
The Draft Model Schedule,47 used for negotiating in telecommunications, built
upon the W/120 services sectoral classification model,48 which was the basis for the
GATS negotiations and derived from the United Nations Central Product
Classification (CPC).49 Without providing explicit corresponding definitions, the
42 See section II.C. below.
43 See above the remarks at the beginning of the current section. See also Cottier and Oesch, as note 16
above, p. 821.
44 Second Computer Inquiry, Docket 20828, Final Decision, FCC 80-189, 77 FCC 2.d 384, 7 April 1980;
Third Computer Inquiry, CC Docket 85-229, Report and Order, FCC 86-252, 104 FCC 2.d 958, 15 May 1986.
45 See Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at pp. 16±18.
46 The above definitions can be found at paras 93 and 97, respectively, of the Second Computer Inquiry (as note
44 above, emphasis added), as referred to by Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, p. 17.
47 Formulated by negotiators during 1993, prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Draft Model
Schedule was included in a formal document as an attachment to Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, Note
by the Secretariat, TS/NGBT/W/1, 2 May 1994. It was later slightly revised and reissued as Draft Model Schedule of
Commitments on Basic Telecommunications, Informal Note by the Secretariat, Job. No 1311, 12 April 1995. Of
significance to the negotiations on basic telecommunications were also two Notes by the Chairman of the Group on
Basic Telecommunications: Notes for Scheduling Basic Telecom Services Commitments (S/GBT/W/2/Rev.1, 16
January 1997) and Market Access Limitations on Spectrum Availability (S/GBT/W/3, 3 February 1997), both
attached to the final Report of the Group on Basic Telecommunications (S/GBT/4, 15 February 1997).
48 See WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List, WTO Doc.MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991.
49 UN Provisional Central Product Classification (CPC), UN Statistical Papers, Series M, No 77, Ver.1.1,
E.91.XVII.7, 1991.
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Draft Model Schedule simply imported by reference the CPC classification and
following the US distinction mechanism, listed as basic telecommunications services:
voice telephone; packet-switched data transmission; circuit-switched data transmission;
telex; telegraph; facsimile and private leased circuit services and other (litera (a) to (g)
and (o) of W/120).50 The remaining telecommunications services of the W/120 sectoral
classification list were framed as value-added services and encompass electronic mail;
voice mail; online information and data base retrieval; electronic data interchange
(EDI); enhanced/value-added facsimile services (including store and forward, store and
retrieve); code and protocol conversion; on-line information and/or data processing
(including transaction processing) (litera (h) to (n) of W/120).51
Table 1 provides a visualization of the dichotomy between basic and value-added
telecommunications services.
TABLE 1: BASIC AND VALUE-ADDED TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES
Telecommunication Services
Basic a. Voice telephone services
b. Packet-switched data transmission services
c. Circuit-switched data transmission services
d. Telex services
e. Telegraph services
f. Facsimile services
g. Private leased circuit services
Value-Added h. Electronic mail
i. Voice mail
j. Online information and data base retrieval
k. Electronic data interchange (EDI)
l. Enhanced/value-added facsimile services, incl. store and forward, store
and retrieve
m. Code and protocol conversion
n. Online information and/or data processing (incl. transaction processing)
Other o. Other (analogue/digital cellular/mobile telephone services; mobile data
services; paging; personal communications services; satellite-based mobile
services (incl. e.g. telephony, data, paging and/or PCS); fixed satellite
services; VSAT services; gateway earthstation services; teleconferencing;
video transport; trunked radio system services.52
Source: WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List, MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991.53
50 See Panel Report, MexicoÐMeasures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R, 2 April 2004, at
paras 7.59 et seq.
51 On the definitions, see extensively Paul L.G. Nihoul, ``Audio-Visual and Telecommunications Services: A
Review of Definitions under WTO Law'', in Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global
Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 360±
370. See section III.C.3., for a critique of the breakdown into value-based and basic telecommunications services.
52 The examples under the category ``other'' are given by the WTO online guidance on telecommunications
services. See as <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_coverage_e.htm> (visited 20 January
2007). Pursuant to the Draft Model Schedule (as note 47 above), they were categorized as ``basic''
telecommunications services.
53 The breakdown into basic and value-added telecommunications of the W/120 classification for
``Telecommunication Services'' does not appear in the official list. It is added pursuant to the Draft Model
Schedule, as discussed above.
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Having clarified this basic WTO terminology, we can now turn to the first
telecommunications specific WTO document, which was initially intended to regulate
only value-added telecommunications services. This instrument is the Annex on
Telecommunications, adopted during the Uruguay Round and attached as an integral part
of GATS 1994.
B. THE ANNEX ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
1. Scope of the Annex on Telecommunications
``Recognizing the specificities of the telecommunications services sector and, in
particular, its dual role as a distinct sector of economic activity and as the underlying
transport means for other economic activities'',54 the Annex on Telecommunications
defines as its objective: to elaborate ``upon the provisions of the Agreement [GATS]
with respect to measures affecting access to and use of public telecommunications transport
networks and services''.55 The Annex thus applies to all measures that affect access to and
use of public telecommunications transport networks and services, as defined in its
Section 3,56 while excluding explicitly ``measures affecting the cable or broadcast
distribution of radio or television programming''.57
It is important to stress at the outset that the Annex on Telecommunications does
not in itself contain or lead to any market access or national treatment obligations for
telecommunications services beyond the commitments that the Members had already
made in their respective schedules. It comes into effect only once a Member has offered a
specific commitment in a given service sector. As made clear by Section 2(c)(i),
``[n]othing in this Annex shall be construed to require a Member to establish, construct,
acquire, lease, operate, or supply telecommunications transport networks or services, other
than as provided for in its Schedule''.58 Thus, as Bronckers and Larouche point out, the
Annex on Telecommunications is in a sense ``comparable to the general GATS
obligations which apply in addition to the specific commitments made in schedules''59
and serves ``. . . as a `bonus' to the specific commitment in a given sector''.60
54 GATS, Annex on Telecommunications, at Section 1.
55 Ibid. (emphasis added). See also Section 2(a) of the Annex.
56 Section 3(a) defines ``telecommunications'' as ``the transmission and reception of signals by any
electromagnetic means''. The subsequent paragraph identifies ``public telecommunications transport service'' as
``any telecommunications transport service required, explicitly or in effect, by a Member to be offered to the public
generally . . [including] inter alia telegraph, telephone, telex, and data transmission typically involving the real-time
transmission of customer-supplied information between two or more points without any end-to-end change in the
form or content of the customer's information''. ``Public telecommunications transport network'' is then defined as
``the public telecommunications infrastructure which permits telecommunications between and among defined
network termination points''.
57 Section 2(b) of the Annex on Telecommunications.
58 Emphasis added. See also Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at paras
7.290±7.294.
59 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 527.
60 Ibid., at p. 528.
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With the benefit of hindsight, one could say that in practice the Annex, despite
being an act on telecommunications, concerned mostly liberalized non-telecommunications
services (such as banking, insurance or other financial services), which, to perform
effectively, required access to and the use of communications networks and services. It
also applied to value-added telecommunications services, since it was for these that
Members had committed at the time of the adoption of the Annex on
Telecommunications in 1994.
Nonetheless, one should not simply conclude upon this basis that the scope of
application of the Annex is solely directed at value-based telecommunications services.
Indeed, as clarified by the Panel in MexicoÐMeasures Affecting Telecommunications
Services,61 the scope of the Annex does also include basic telecommunications services,62
when commitments for these had been made. The Panel stated in this regard that, ``[i]t
would . . . be unreasonable to suppose that the access and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and services that is essential to the
international supply of basic telecommunications services was not intended to be
covered by the Annex''.63
2. Contents of the Annex on Telecommunications
The core provision of the Annex on Telecommunications is contained in its
Section 5. It ensures that foreign suppliers of services are accorded access to and use of
public telecommunications transport networks and services on reasonable64 and non-
discriminatory65 terms and conditions. In addition to this general rule, Section 5(b)
provides for a more specific obligation to ensure access to and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and services by allowing foreign suppliers:
(i) to purchase or lease and attach terminal or other equipment, which interfaces
with the network and which is necessary to supply a supplier's services;
(ii) to interconnect private leased or owned circuits with public
61 Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above.
62 On the scope of application of the Annex on Telecommunications, see Panel Report, MexicoÐ
Telecommunications Services, as note 50 above, in particular at paras 7.273±7.288.
63 Ibid., at para. 7.288.
64 Annex on Telecommunications, at Section 5(a). The Annex on Negotiations on Basic
Telecommunications clarifies that, ``[t]he term `non-discriminatory' is understood to refer to most-favoured-
nation and national treatment as defined in the Agreement, as well as to reflect sector-specific usage of the term to
mean `terms and conditions no less favourable than those accorded to any other user of like public
telecommunications transport networks or services under like circumstances'''. See also Panel Report, MexicoÐ
Telecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at paras 7.329 et seq.
65 With regard to ``reasonable'' terms and conditions, the Panel found in the Telmex Report that, `` . . rates
which exceed cost-based rates to this extent, and whose uniform nature excludes price competition in the relevant
market of the telecommunications services bound under Mexico's Schedule, do not provide access to and use of
public telecommunications transport networks and services in Mexico `on reasonable . . terms'''. Consequently the
Panel found that Mexico had failed to meet its obligations under Section 5(a) of the GATS Annex on
Telecommunications by failing to ensure that US service suppliers were accorded access to and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and services in Mexico on reasonable terms. See Panel Report, MexicoÐ
Telecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at para. 7.334.
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telecommunications transport networks and services or with circuits leased or
owned by another service supplier; and
(iii) to use operating protocols of the service supplier's choice in the supply of any
service, other than as necessary to ensure the availability of
telecommunications transport networks and services to the public generally.
The ``access'' obligations of Section 5 are however ``subordinated to . . . and qualified
by''66 certain restrictions. The latter are formulated in paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 5
and can be imposed only if necessary: (i) to safeguard the public service responsibilities
of suppliers of public telecommunications transport networks and services, in particular
their ability to make their networks or services available to the public generally; (ii) to
protect the technical integrity of the pubic networks; or (iii) to ensure that service
suppliers of any other Member do not supply services unless permitted by the
commitments in the Member's Schedule.67 The conditions may specifically include:
(i) restrictions on resale or shared use; (ii) requirements to use specified technical
interfaces, including interface protocols, for interconnection with such networks and
services; (iii) requirements, where necessary, for the interoperability of such services;
(iv) type approval of terminal or other equipment; (v) restrictions on interconnection of
private leased or owned circuits; or (vi) notification, registration and licensing.68
3. Interim Observations on the Annex on Telecommunications
Although the Annex on Telecommunications does not of itself create a right to
supply a service where no commitments exist, it substantially facilitates market access
for committed service sectors and thereby ``ensures a level playing field for services
suppliers who depend on the access to telecommunications, which could otherwise
turn into a non-tariff barrier to trade''.69
The level of commitments embodied in the Annex is understandable if seen in the
context of the period of its adoption. At the time of the Uruguay talks, only value-
added telecommunications services were provided by private undertakings operating in
a competitive environment and basic telecommunications were still public monopolies
in almost all Member States. A full liberalization of these services was unimaginable.70
Against this background, the Annex was an appropriate tool, which struck ``a fragile
balance between the needs of users for fair terms of access and the needs of the
66 Ibid., at para. 7.308 (emphases in the original).
67 Annex on Telecommunications, at Section 5(e).
68 Ibid., at Section 5(f). Pursuant to para. (g), a developing country may impose other conditions ``necessary to
strengthen its domestic telecommunications infrastructure and service capacity and to increase its participation in
international trade in telecommunications services''. See also Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as
note 50 above, at para. 7.388.
69 Mathew, as note 4 above, at p. 77.
70 See Kelly Cameron, ``Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services in the Context of the WTO:
Today and Tomorrow'', in Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in
Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 22 et seq.
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regulators and public telecommunications operators to maintain a system that works
and that meets public service objectives''.71
Now that a significant number of Members have included basic
telecommunications in their schedules of commitments and after the broad
interpretation of the Section 5 obligations by the Telmex Report, the role of the
Annex of Telecommunications may be enhanced rather than diminished.72 Even after
the further-reaching commitments made under the Fourth Protocol and the Reference
Paper (discussed below), the Annex on Telecommunications remains relevant where:
(i) a WTO Member has made no commitments under the Fourth Protocol; (ii) a
Member has made commitments under the Fourth Protocol but has not committed to
the principles of the Reference Paper; (iii) for issues falling outside the scope of the
Reference Paper; (iv) when a Member has committed in a service sector other than
telecommunications, for foreign service suppliers in that sector when dealing with the
incumbent telecommunications operator; and finally, as originally designed; (v) for
value-added telecommunications services. Since the Annex on Telecommunications is
applicable to all Members (in contrast to the Fourth Protocol and the Reference Paper),
it remains a useful instrument for guaranteeing access to foreign markets.73
C. THE FOURTH PROTOCOL
The Annex on Telecommunications was not the end of the negotiations in the
field but provided an interim solution74 until the core issues of basic telecommunications
could be adequately addressed. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the Members
adopted a decision to enter into voluntary negotiations on the liberalization of trade for
the provision of basic telecommunications services.75 Pending the conclusion of these
negotiations, Members were granted an MFN exemption for measures affecting the
provision of such basic telecommunications.76
The negotiations took place under the auspices of the Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecommunications (NGBT) and were scheduled to conclude no later than 30 April
71 WTO, Explanation of the Annex on Telecommunications. See <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
telecom_e/telecom_annex_expl_e.htm> (visited 10 July 2007).
72 Cottier and Oesch, as note 16 above, at p. 880.
73 Confirming the above, the Panel noted in MexicoÐTelecommunications Services that, `` . . although the
obligations in the Annex and the Reference Paper may overlap in certain respects, there are clear differences
between the two instruments. First, the Annex sets out general obligations for access to and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and services, applicable to all Members and all sectors in which specific
commitments have been undertaken. Reference Paper obligations, as additional commitments, are applicable only
by Members that have included them in their schedules, and they apply only to basic telecommunications. Second,
while the Annex applies to all operators of public telecommunications transport networks and services within a
Member, regardless of their competitive situation, the Reference Paper obligations on interconnection apply only
with respect to `major suppliers'. Third, the Annex broadly deals with `access to and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and services', while the Reference Paper focuses on specific
`competitive safeguards' and on `interconnection'''. See WTO Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services,
as note 50 above, at para. 7.331 (emphases in the original).
74 Cameron defines it as a ``status quo agreement''. See Cameron, as note 70 above, at p. 21.
75 See GATS, Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, 15 April 1994.
76 See GATS, Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications.
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1996. By then, however, the talks had resulted in offers from only 48 governments and
some Members (in particular the United States77) saw the packages as not yet sufficient
for a successful completion of the talks. At the meeting in April 1996, the then WTO
Director-General Renato Ruggiero, despite the lack of finalization of the negotiations,
insisted on preserving the achieved so far. Consequently, the results of the talks were
attached to a Protocol (the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in
Services78) and a one-month period was granted (15 January to 15 February 1997)
during which Members could re-examine their positions on market access and national
treatment, and modify their attachments to the protocol.79 A new bodyÐthe Group on
Basic Telecommunications (GBT)Ðwas formed for implementing this extension of
the negotiations.80 The bargaining continued81 and the talks were eventually finalized
on 15 February 1997.
The agreement reached thereby is generally known as the Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications. It consists of a series of schedules of specific commitments
concerning basic telecommunications.82 Such commitments were submitted at the
time by 69 Members,83 the 15 EC Member States submitting one schedule.84 The
commitments supplemented or modified the existing Members' submissions and were
annexed to the existing schedules through the above-mentioned Fourth Protocol,
which forms an integral part of GATS.85 The Fourth Protocol entered into force on
77 The main opposition came understandably from the United States, which was already substantially ahead
in the process of liberalizing its telecommunications markets and insisted that the other WTO Members commit to
opening their markets. The US justified its refusal to conclude an agreement with the claim that a critical mass of
market access commitments had not been reached, in particular from developing countries. See Bronckers and
Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 523.
78 WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/20, 30 April 1996. A ``First''
Protocol to the GATS never actually materialized. The Second Protocol is on Financial Services, the Third
Protocol concerns the Movement of Natural Persons.
79 See Decision on Commitments in Basic Telecommunications, S/L/19, 30 April 1996.
80 The European Commission authorized by the Council submitted to the WTO the final schedule of
commitments on behalf of the European Community and its Member States on 14 February 1997.
81 The newly formed Group on Basic Telecommunications agreed to modify the rules on participation in
meetings (in comparison to the rules of NGBT), so that all WTO Members had a full voice in its activities
(governments under accession participated upon request as observers). The negotiations also received important
political support at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, December 1996. See WTO Ministerial
Declaration, Singapore 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC. In the end, 32 of the 34 offers of April 1996 were revised, and
21 new offers were submitted. For an overview of the schedules of specific commitments attached to the Fourth
Protocol, see Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at pp. 21±22.
82 Supplementary to the Schedules, the Chairman of the Group on Basic Telecommunications issued two
explanatory notes clarifying certain issues applicable to the scheduling of commitments. See Note by the Chairman
of the GBT, Notes for Scheduling Basic Telecom Services Commitments and Note by the Chairman of the GBT,
Market Access Limitations on Spectrum Availability, both as note 47 above
83 Since the conclusion of the Fourth Protocol, five of the initial signatories have improved their
commitments (Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan, Switzerland and Venezuela). Fifteen new WTO Members (Albania,
Armenia, China, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Nepal, Oman and Taiwan) made commitments on basic communications in the course of their initial schedules of
specific commitments. For a qualitative analysis, see Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at pp. 530 et seq.
84 Council Decision 97/838/EC concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community of the
results of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications services, as note 13 above.
85 Article XX:3 GATS.
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5 February 1998,86 although its entry was initially planned for 1 January 1998Ðthe
same date as the entry into force of the EC Full Competition Directive.87
1. The Reference Paper
A major breakthrough of the Fourth Protocol was the adoption of the now almost
``legendary'' Reference Paper88 as an additional commitment incorporated into the
Members' schedules.89 It is indeed, as we shall see below, a special instrument within
the WTO legal structure and of particular importance to the global
telecommunications regime.
2. Scope of the Reference Paper
The scope of the Reference Paper is explicitly limited to basic telecommunications
services, as provided in the Paper itself.90 This is a limitation that has been confirmed by
the MexicoÐTelecommunications Services Panel Report,91 although the rationale for this is
somewhat unclear and not necessarily logical, since value-added telecommunications
had already been liberalized at the time of the adoption of the Reference Paper.
Before beginning our analysis of the Reference Paper and in the context of
defining its scope, it is important to recall a point made above, namely that the Paper
falls under the category of ``additional commitments'', which Members can make
pursuant to Article XVIII GATS. As such, first, one should bear in mind that the
Reference Paper attached to each Member's Schedule of Commitments, although
86 In a number of schedules, the Member's commitments for particular services are to be ``phased in''. For
these, while the schedules entered formally into force on the date of the Fourth Protocol as a whole, the actual
implementation date for such commitments was that specified in the schedule.
87 Commission Directive 96/19/EC amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of
full competition in telecommunications markets, OJ L 74/13, 22 March 1996.
88 The Reference Paper is so named, because its rules are integrated into the GATS by reference made to it in
the schedules of commitments. On the Reference Paper, see Peter Holmes, Jeremy Kempton and Francis
McGowan, International Competition Policy and TelecommunicationsÐLessons from the EU and Prospects for the WTO, 20
Telecommunications Policy 10 (1996), 755±767; Markus Fredebeul-Krein and Andreas Freytag,
Telecommunications and WTO DisciplineÐAn Assessment of the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services, 21
Telecommunications Policy 6 (1997), 477±491; William J. Drake and Eli M. Noam, The WTO Deal on Basic
TelecommunicationsÐBig Bang or Little Whimper?, 21 Telecommunications Policy 9/10 (1997), 799±818; Markus
Fredebeul-Krein and Andreas Freytag, The Case for a More Binding WTO Agreement on Regulatory Principles in
Telecommunications Markets, 23 Telecommunications Policy (1999), 625±644; Chantal Blouin, The WTO Agreement
on Basic Telecommunications: a Reevaluation, 24 Telecommunications Policy (2000), 135±142; Mathew, as note 4
above, at pp. 124±199; Graber, as note 10 above, at pp. 204 et seq.; Philip Marsden, A Competition Policy for the
WTO (London: Cameron May, 2003), pp. 228 et seq.; Damien Geradin and Michel Kerf, ``Levelling the Playing
Field: Is the WTO Adequately Equipped to Prevent Anti-Competitive Practices in Telecommunications?'', in
Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual
Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 144±157; Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above,
at pp. 532±552.
89 Of the parties to the Fourth Protocol, only Ecuador and Tunisia entered no additional commitments
under the Reference Paper. Bolivia, India, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela
adopted only parts of it. Bangladesh, Brazil, Mauritius and Thailand have agreed to follow the Reference Paper at a
later date. See note 84 above.
90 See Reference Paper, at ``Scope''.
91 See WTO Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at para. 7.331.
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generally alike, may in fact differ from country to country and should therefore be
considered individually.92 Second, as an additional commitment, the Reference Paper
could neither lessen nor derogate the general GATS principles. Neither could any
possible interpretation violate them.93
3. Contents of the Reference Paper
The contents of the Reference Paper are best described as a mixture of
competition law and sector specific rules. In terms of competition rules, the Reference
Paper defines two key notions, namely those of major supplier and of essential facilities and
prescribes certain competitive safeguards as formulated in Section 1. In terms of sectoral
regulation, its most significant provision is that regarding interconnection in Section 2. We
briefly consider the nature and impact of these concepts and the rest of the rules of the
Reference Paper in the following Sections.
(a) Definitions
Pursuant to the Reference Paper, a ``major supplier'' is defined as ``a supplier
which has the ability to materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to
price and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecommunications services as a
result of: (a) control over essential facilities; or (b) use of its position in the market''.94
The Reference Paper defines ``essential facilities'' as ``facilities of a public
telecommunications transport network or service that: (a) are exclusively or
predominantly provided by a single or a limited number of suppliers; and (b) cannot
feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a service''.95
The Panel Report in MexicoÐTelecommunications Services provided significant
(albeit equivocal) guidance on the concept of ``major supplier''.96 In its considerations
as to whether the Mexican incumbent TeleÂfonos de Mexico DA de CV (Telmex)
constitutes a ``major supplier'', the Panel applied a three-step test and examined: (i) the
``relevant market''; (ii) whether Telmex had ``the ability to materially affect the terms of
participation''97 in that market and finally, (iii) whether this ability resulted from
``control over essential facilities'' or ``use of its position in the market''.98 As a first step,
the Panel identified the relevant market for basic telecommunications services on the
92 The Panel Report MexicoÐTelecommunications Services (ibid.) exemplified this approach. What is explored
in the following sections is essentially the basic text of the Reference Paper and not any individual Member's
schedule.
93 Clough, as note 33 above, at p. 83.
94 Reference Paper, at ``Definitions'', para. 3. For some interesting details of the negotiating history of the
``major supplier'' definition, see Marsden, as note 88 above, at pp. 229±230.
95 Reference Paper, at ``Definitions'', para. 2.
96 Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, supra as note 50 above, in particular at paras 7.145±
7.159 and 7.226±7.228.
97 As defined by the Reference Paper, as note 94 above.
98 Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at para. 4.178.
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basis of the demand substitution criterion and found (without much ado) that the
```relevant market for telecommunications services' for the services at issueÐvoice,
switched data and faxÐis the termination of these services in Mexico''.99
As to the second point, the Panel considered the arguments of the United States
that the notion of ``can materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to
price and supply)'' corresponds to the concept of ``market power'', as used by the US
competition authorities and its Mexican equivalent of ``substantial power''. The United
States further submitted that in determining whether a firm has market power, the US
antitrust authorities normally examined factors such as market share, barriers to entry,
capacities of firms in the market, availability of substitutes and opportunities for
coordinated behaviour among firms.100 The Panel did not however follow any of these
lines of analysis and based its conclusion simply upon the text of Mexico's International
Long Distance (ILD) Rules granting Telmex the sole right to negotiate settlement rates.
The Panel found consequently that,
``. . . since Telmex is legally required to negotiate settlement rates for the entire market for
termination of the services at issue from the United States, . . . it has patently met the definitional
requirement in Mexico's Reference Paper that it have `the ability to materially affect the terms of
participation', particularly `having regard to price' ''.101
Having established this, the Panel was also able to reach a conclusion on the third
element of the ``major supplier'' test (point (iii) above), since Telmex's ability to impose
uniform settlement rates on competitors was the very ``use'' of its special ``position in
the market'', granted to it under the ILD Rules.102 Consequently, the Panel found that
Telmex was a ``major supplier'', ``with respect to termination of the services at issue, in
that it has the ability to materially affect the price of termination of calls from the
United States into Mexico, as a result of its special position in the market, which allows
it to set a uniform price applying to all its competitors on terminating calls from the
United States''.103
Interestingly, in its further analysis under Section 1 of the Reference Paper, the
Panel, without much deliberation, applied a peculiar syllogism and stated that, ``[t]he
practices at issue involve not only Telmex, but all the other Mexican suppliers who are
gateway operators. Since we have already found that Telmex alone is a `major supplier'
within the meaning of Section 1, and that the practices at issue involve acts of all the
Mexican suppliers who are gateway operators, we can conclude also that Telmex and all
the other Mexican gateway operators are together a `major supplier'''.104 Hence, the
Panel found the existence of a cartel and considered it banned under the Reference
Paper.
99 Ibid., at para. 7.152.
100 Ibid., at para. 7.153, referring to the first submission of the United States, at paras 79±81.
101 Ibid., at para. 7.155 (emphasis in the original).
102 Ibid., at para. 7.158.
103 Ibid., at para. 7.159.
104 Ibid., at para. 7.227 (emphasis in the original).
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The Panel had unfortunately no occasion for elaborating upon the second test for
finding a ``major supplier'', where the ability to materially affect the terms of
participation in the relevant market stems from control over essential facilities. In the
context of examining the Reference Paper, it is however noteworthy that the Paper
sees the control over facilities as ``a problem analytically separate from that of large
market positions''.105
(b) Section 1
The concept of ``major supplier'', as identified above, is a key trigger for the
obligations enshrined in the Reference Paper. Pursuant to Section 1 thereof, such a
supplier must bear certain appropriate measures for the purpose of preventing anti-
competitive practices, whether current or future. Such anti-competitive practices
include in particular: (i) cross-subsidization; (ii) use of information obtained from
competitors with anti-competitive results; and (iii) ``not making available to other
service suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities and
commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to provide
services''.106
The Telmex Panel pointed out that this list is by no means exhaustive and the
examples given do not represent all anti-competitive practices within the scope of the
provision. Turning to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and the Merriam-Webster
Dictionary for guidance, the Panel concluded that, ``the term `anti-competitive practices'
is broad in scope, suggesting actions that lessen rivalry or competition in the
market''.107 The Panel went on to state that the given ``examples do however illustrate
certain practices that were considered to be particularly relevant in the
telecommunications sector. The first exampleÐon cross-subsidizationÐindicates
that `anti-competitive practices' may also include pricing actions by a major supplier.
All three examples show that `anti-competitive practices' may also include action by a
major supplier without collusion or agreement with other suppliers. Cross-
subsidization, misuse of competitor information, and withholding of relevant
technical and commercial information are all practices which a major supplier can,
and might normally, undertake on its own''.108 It was further established that the
concept of ``anti-competitive practices'' also encompasses horizontal coordination, as
examined in the light of the definition of ``major supplier'' and Section 1.1 of the
105 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 536.
106 Reference Paper, at Section 1. On the interpretation of the concept of ``anti-competitive practices'', see
Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, ibid., at paras 7.229±7.245.
107 Ibid., at para. 7.230.
108 Ibid., at para. 7.232 (emphases in the original).
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Reference Paper.109 Practices required under a Member's law could equally qualify as
``anti-competitive practices''.110
The concept of ``appropriate measures'', which the major supplier(s) should bear
are not elaborated upon in the Reference Paper. It provides no guidance either as to
exactly what these types of measure might be, or as to their appropriateness. In the
Telmex Report,111 the Panel had limited opportunity to deliberate upon this term and
its contents, since Mexico's measure was found in itself to legally require the anti-
competitive conduct.112 The Panel did nonetheless state that the word ``appropriate'' in
its general dictionary sense, should be understood as ``specially suitable, proper''113 and
in that sense, pointed out that ```appropriate measures' are those that are suitable for
achieving their purposeÐin this case that of `preventing a major supplier from engaging
in or continuing anti-competitive practices'''.114 Section 1 thus allows for a degree of
flexibility as to the precise content of the ``appropriate measures''115 and this may
include rules of antitrust, as well as of a sector specific nature.
(c) Section 2
Section 2 of the Reference Paper imposes an important obligation on major
suppliers of public telecommunications transport networks and services to enable
interconnection with their networks and services ``at any technically feasible point in the
network''. Such interconnection should be provided:
(i) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions and rates and of a quality no less
favourable than that provided for its own like services or for like services of
non-affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;
(ii) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions and cost-oriented rates that are
transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently
unbundled; and
109 The Panel based its wider interpretation on the Members' own competition legislation, on some
international instruments addressing competition policy, such as Article 46 of the 1948 Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization and the OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against
Hardcore Cartels (C/M[98]7/PROV). It also made reference to the work of the WTO Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (see Report [2002] of the Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council [WT/WGTCP/6] and Report [2003], [WT/
WGTCP/7]). See Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at paras 7.234±7.238. It is
important to note that the aforementioned Havana Charter never in fact came into effect.
110 Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at paras 7.239-7.245. In their
submissions as a third party to the latter case, the European Communities expressed a different position. They
pointed out that the fixing of a uniform price cannot be an anti-competitive practice since uniform prices were
required by law and that if Mexico chose not to allow competition between telecommunications on a certain
matter, there was no scope for anti-competitive practices relating to that matter, since it is not possible to restrict
competition where competition is not allowed. See European Communities' third party submission, in particular at
paras 49 and 53.
111 Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at paras 7.265±7.269.
112 Ibid., at para. 7.266. See also note 110 above.
113 Ibid., at para. 7.265, referring to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd end, London: Clarendon Press,
1990), p. 94.
114 Id.
115 Ibid., at para. 7.267.
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(iii) upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered
to the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction
of necessary additional facilities.
The Panel had the opportunity to examine in detail the terms ``cost-oriented'',
``reasonable'' and ``having regard to economic feasibility'', which were contentious in
the Telmex dispute.116 It found notably that, ``the increasing and wide-spread usage of
incremental cost methodologies among WTO Members supports the interpretation of
the term `cost-oriented' as meaning the costs incurred in supplying the service, and that
the use of long term incremental cost methodologies, such as those required in
Mexican law, is consistent with this meaning''.117 It further clarified that, the
. . . qualification of ``cost-oriented rates'' by the word ``reasonable'' would not . . . permit costs to
be included in the rate that were not incurred in the supply of the interconnection service. Thus,
contrary to Mexico's position, the general state of the telecommunications industry, the
coverage and quality of the network, and whether rates are established under an accounting rate
regime, are not relevant to determining a proper cost-oriented rate.118
Ultimately, ``having regard to economic feasibility'' was interpreted in the sense
that, ``the major supplier is entitled to rates that allow it to undertake interconnection
on an `economic' basis, that is, to make a reasonable rate of return''.119
Finally with regard to interconnection, but in terms of more general policy
prescriptions, the Reference Paper obliges the committed Members to make the
interconnection procedures publicly available and the interconnection agreements
subject to transparency requirements, so that the ``major supplier will make available
either its interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer''.120 Service
providers must also have (at any time or after a reasonable period of time which has
been made publicly known) recourse to an independent domestic body to resolve any
disputes that may arise in respect to interconnection.121
(d) Other provisions
The other four provisions (Sections 3±6) of the Reference Paper address universal
service, licensing, regulators' independence and scarce resources. They apply not only to
undertakings falling under the category of ``major supplier'' but encompass some basic
116 Ibid., in particular at paras 7.160 et seq.
117 Ibid., at para. 7.177.
118 Ibid., at para. 7.183.
119 Ibid., at para. 7.184. This explanation was also supported by the negotiating history of the provision,
which adapted the language of the EC Interconnection Directive. See Directive 97/33/EC of 30 June 1997 on
interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through
application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ L 199/32, 26 July 1997. Article 7(2) therein
provides that, ``[c]harges for interconnection shall follow the principles of transparency and cost orientation. The
burden of proof that charges are derived from actual costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall
lie with the organization providing interconnection to its facilities''.
120 Reference Paper, at Section 2.4.
121 Reference Paper, at Section 2.5.
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regulatory principles for telecommunications applicable to all. In respect to universal
service, the Paper allows the Members to define the type of universal service obligation
they wish to maintain and states that such obligations will not be regarded as anti-
competitive per se, provided that they are administered in a transparent, non-
discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than
necessary.122 In respect to licensing, where a licence is required, all licensing criteria and
the terms and conditions of individual licences must be made publicly available, as well
as the reasons for denial of a licence.123 Further, although the need for, or the form of, a
regulatory body in the field of telecommunications is not discussed, the Reference
Paper imposes an obligation upon Members to ensure that such regulators are ``separate
from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services''.124
Finally, with regard to allocation and use of scarce resources (including frequencies,
numbers and rights of way), any procedure relating to these is to be carried out in ``an
objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner''.125
4. Interim Observations on the Reference Paper
The above discussion suggests that the Reference Paper is a unique legal
document. In terms of content, although it is only six Sections long, it represents
(together with the Fourth Protocol and the attached schedules of commitments) an
immense step forward in the opening of the telecommunications markets126 and has
rendered telecommunications ``one of the best-covered service sectors of the
GATS''.127 Furthermore, it ensured that the advantages of the former monopoly
operators were not used to the detriment of new entrants during the precarious process
of liberalizing telecommunications.128
In terms of design, ``[i]t is the first to spell out what regulatory measures are
considered appropriate''129 for telecommunications at a global level. Defining ``ends''
rather than ``means'', the legal principles of the Reference Paper could thus be used by
the Members as a basic model for further shaping of their respective national regulatory
environments.
122 Reference Paper, at Section 3.
123 Reference Paper, at Section 4.
124 Reference Paper, at Section 5.
125 Reference Paper, at Section 6.
126 According to the US Trade Representative, the 56 countries that committed to the Fourth Protocol and
the Reference Paper and permitted foreign ownership or control of all telecommunications services and facilities,
account for 97 percent of the total basic telecommunications services revenue of WTO Members. See Annex to
the Statement of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky on Basic Telecom Negotiations, USTR, 15 February 1997, as referred to
by Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at p. 22. For a critique, see Drake and Noam, as note 88 above, at
pp. 812±818.
127 Drake and Noam, as note 88 above, at p. 806.
128 See Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at p. 23. In that sense, the role of the Reference Paper can
be compared to that of the Open Network Provision (ONP) framework during the liberalization of EC
telecommunications markets, albeit at the international level.
129 Paul Nihoul and Peter Rodford, EU Electronic Communications Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), para. 1.176.
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Another particular design feature of the Reference Paper is the inclusion of
competition law-like provisions, as discussed above. Although one could argue that
there are other provisions in the WTO framework that touch upon antitrust issues,130
the Reference Paper contains the most ``elaborate'' rules in this context so far,131
including core concepts of competition law related to dominance and abuse of market
power.
Despite the presence of these antitrust notions, it would be an exaggeration to state
that the Reference Paper provides a comprehensive competition law framework for
telecommunications networks and services. First, as mentioned above, it is not a purely
antitrust act, but rather a mixture of competition provisions and sector specific rules,
with a prevalence of the latter.132 Second, from a competition law perspective, the
Reference Paper is incomplete and often vague, since certain aspects of antitrust such as
excessive pricing or collusive behaviour are not dealt with.133 Third, it is not very clear
whether the concepts of ``major supplier'' and ``essential facilities'' correspond to the
strict standard of market power established under EC or US antitrust.134 If we take, for
instance, the concept of ``essential facilities'', the two-tier test suggested by the
Reference Paper does not match the rather stringent ``essentiality'' test, as formulated
by the case law of the EC Courts135 or the US Supreme Court, especially after the
recent case of Trinko.136 A facility that ``cannot feasibly be economically or technically
130 See, for instance, Articles 8 and 31(c) and (k) of the TRIPs and Article 9 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). See also Roland Weinrauch, Competition Law in the WTO (Vienna and
Graz: Neuer wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2004), pp. 131±150, and Background Note by the Secretariat, The
Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation and Transparency, WT/WGTCP/W/114, 14
April 1999.
131 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at p. 43; Holmes, Kempton and McGowan, as note 88 above,
at p. 765.
132 Pierre Larouche defines it as a ``regulatory framework for telecommunications (sector specific regulation
and competition law) seen through a trade law filter''. See Pierre Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in
European Telecommunications (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 342.
133 For a critique of the Reference Paper, see Drake and Noam, as note 88 above, at pp. 817±818; Bronckers
and Larouche, as note 10 above, at pp. 23 et seq.; Fredebeul-Krein and Freytag, as note 88 above, at pp. 628 et seq.;
Blouin, as note 88 above, at pp. 140 et seq.; Larouche, as note 132 above, at pp. 342±343; Luff, as note 22 above, at
pp. 1067 et seq.; Marsden, as note 88 above, at pp. 228 et seq.; and Geradin and Kerf, as note 88 above, at pp. 146 et
seq., who also suggest a model for improvement of the Reference Paper in the direction of more precision,
simplicity and flexibility.
134 Marsden, as note 88 above, at p. 231.
135 See, in particular, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co KG etc. [1998] ECR I-7791, [1999] 4 CMLR 112. On the essential facilities doctrine, see Abbott B.
Lipsky Jr and J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 Stanford Law Review (1999), 1187±1249; Barry Doherty, Just
What Are Essential Facilities?, 38 Common Market Law Review (2001), 397±436; Damien Geradin, Limiting the
Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the EU Learn from the US Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the Wake
of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche Telekom, 41 Common Market Law Review (2004), 1519±1553.
136 Verizon Communications Inc v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 682 (2004). The US Supreme
Court drew, among others, three important conclusions in Trinko: (i) first, it substantially narrowed down the
possibilities for granting mandatory access and held that its ruling in Aspen Skiing (Aspen Skiing Co v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585 (1985)), which is normally identified as the epitome of the essential facilities
doctrine, was ``at or near the outer boundary of Section 2 liability''. Indeed, it dismissed the EFD itself as ``crafted
by some lower courts''; (ii) second, the Court argued that mandatory access may conflict with one of the objectives
of antitrust by reducing incentives to invest; and (iii) third, it found that if antitrust courts were to grant access to
essential products or services, this would force them to act as ``central planners'', since they would essentially need
to engage in pricing and other regulatory discussions for which they are ill-suited. See Geradin, as note 135 above.
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substituted''137 does imply a lower threshold,138 although arguably a future Panel or
Appellate Body decision could strengthen this test. It could also be pointed out that at
the time of the adoption of the Reference Paper, the concept of ``major supplier'' as a
trigger for asymmetric regulation was related, at least in the EC context, to a
mechanism of finding significant market power in telecommunications markets, which
was equated to a market share of 25 percent.139
These shortcomings of the Reference Paper could again (as with the scope of
commitments under the Annex on Telecommunications and essentially with every
agreement based on negotiations) be understood if seen through the prism of the
moment of its adoption. This period, in early 1997, was one of ``transition'' of both the
telecommunications industry and the markets. Few countries had as yet liberalized their
domestic telecommunications markets and the historical national monopolists were still
dominant if not de jure, at least de facto.140 The vagueness and the flexibility of the
Reference Paper allowed for accommodation of the different regulatory philosophies of
the countries involved141 and for an actual agreement on basic telecommunications to
be reached. Despite its shortcomings, the Reference Paper could be seen as a step in the
right direction for the development of telecommunications. First, because it provides a
proper basis and a flexible mode for further commitments in the field of
telecommunications. Second, and perhaps more importantly, because its principles
are binding under GATS, they could be tested through the WTO dispute settlement
system.
Proof of this is the already mentioned, and so far the only, Panel decision in the
field of telecommunications services MexicoÐMeasures Affecting Telecommunications
Services.142 Therein, the provisions of Reference Paper were widely interpreted and
137 Reference Paper, at Definitions, para. 2.
138 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 536.
139 See Article 2(3) of Directive 92/44/EEC on the application of open network provision to leased lines, OJ
L 165/27, 19 June 1992, as amended by Directive 97/51/EC of 6 October 1997 amending Council Directives 90/
387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications, OJ L
295/23, 29 October 1997; Article 4(3) of Directive 97/33/EC of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in
telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the
principles of the Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ L 199/32, 26 July 1997; Article 2(2)(i) of Directive 98/10/
EC of 26 February 1998 on the application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on
universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, OJ L 101/24, 1 April 1998. On the ONP
mechanism, see Larouche, as note 132 above, at pp. 25±32. See also Clough, as note 33 above, at p. 67.
140 Even in the European Community, which was well ahead in the deregulation of the telecommunications
sector, public voice telephony was still not liberalized at the time and the date for the full liberalization was set at 1
January 1998.
141 See Laura B. Sherman, Wildly Enthusiastic about the First Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications
Services, 51 Federal Communications Law Journal (1999), 73.
142 As note 50 above. For a comment, see Christoph Beat Graber, Mexiko unterliegt USA im ersten WTO-
Telekommunikationsfall. Anmerkungen zum Entscheid des WTO-Panels i.S. Mexiko ± Massnahmen betreffend
Telekommunikationsdienste (WT/DS204/R), 3 medialex (2004), 176±177; Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33
above, at pp. 533 et seq.; Antonio Ortiz Mena and Ricardo Rodriguez, Mexico's International Telecommunications
Policy: Origins, the WTO Dispute, and Future Challenges, 29 Telecommunications Policy (2005), 429±448; J.
Gregory Sidak and Hal J. Singer, UÈberregulation without Economics: The World Trade Organization's Decision in the US±
Mexico Arbitration on Telecommunications Services, 57 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2004), 1-48; Philip
Marsden, WTO Decides First Competition Case ± With Disappointing Results, Competition Law Insight (2004), 3±9;
Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO's First Antitrust CaseÐMexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition,
Journal of International Economic Law 2 (2006), 271±292.
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concepts, such as ``major supplier'' and ``anti-competitive practices'' were given a more
specific definition and a clear antitrust connotation.143
It might seem that the Reference Paper could be used as the basis for settling
competition law disputes in telecommunications. Perhaps even in the absence of
general competition rules within the WTO framework,144 the Paper might provide for
a sufficient (if not fully comprehensive) telecommunications regulation, if there were
enough Panel and/or Appellate Body decisions to cover and elaborate upon all
significant aspects of competition in telecommunications markets.
However, it is important to ask whether such a development would be positive.
The above broad interpretation of the text of the Reference Paper could be construed
as a violation of Article 3.2 DSU, which states that, ``[r]ecommendations and rulings of
the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements''.145 Indeed, the vagueness of the
Reference Paper entails a risk of ``suboptimal interpretation''146 and may endanger legal
certainty and legitimate expectations.147 The Panel Report MexicoÐTelecommunications
Services is a confirmation of this angst. The approach and the analyses of the Panel were
at times rather simplistic and showed a lack of ability to deal with complex competition
law issues.148 A reference to dictionaries for interpreting antitrust concepts, such as
``anti-competitive practices'',149 is arguably not the appropriate methodology.150
Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does prescribe a search of
the ``ordinary meaning'' of the terms, it is to be done ``in their context'' and in the light
of the object and purpose of the treaty at issue.151 Furthermore, the Panel's
interpretation lacked coherence, ranging from a simple verbatim interpretation of the
text to a rather broad teleological one (such as notably, the finding of a cartel).
Moreover, the application of competition law in the telecommunications sector is
a complex exercise that requires not only an interpretation of the terms used, but also
thorough economic analysis.152 The experience both in the EU and in the United
143 See section II.C. above; and Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at pp. 540 et seq.
144 Fox, as note 142 above.
145 See also Article 19.2 DSU; van den Bossche, as note 16 above, at pp. 220 et seq.; Joost Pauwelyn, ``Human
Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement'', in Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn and Elisabeth BuÈrgi (eds), Human Rights
and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 215 et seq.
146 Arlan Gates, Convergence and Competition: Technological Change, Industry Concentration and Competition Policy
in the Telecommunications Sector, 58 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 2 (2000), fn. 82, at 99.
147 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 552.
148 Marsden, as note 142 above, at pp. 4 et seq.
149 Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, in particular at paras 7.229 et seq.
150 Marsden, as note 142 above, at p. 5.
151 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (8 ILM 679, 1969, entered into force
27 January 1980) states that, ``[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose''. See Marsden, as
note 142 above, at pp. 7±8. See, generally, on the interpretation of WTO law norms, Gabrielle Marceau, Conflict of
Norms and Conflict of Jurisdictions, 35 Journal of World Trade 6 (December 2001), 1081±1131.
152 See, e.g., Pierre A. Buigues and Patrick Rey (eds), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in
Telecommunications (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004). See also Burri Nenova, as note 6 above, at ch. 4. For a
comprehensive presentation of the economic issues related to the finding of dominance, see Robert O'Donoghue
and Jorge Atilano Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing,
2006).
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States shows multiple difficulties related to analysing telecommunications markets,
which stem from their intrinsic characteristics as a network-bound, dynamic and
converging sector, prone to bottlenecks and leverage of market power.153
In that sense, although there is room for interpreting and consolidating the
Reference Paper, the question is where the limits of this interpretation lie: for instance,
can the Reference Paper, as a mixed set of rules, be overstretched to cover situations
that are not contained in it, such as notably a cartel ban? The opinions on this differ.
Some consider that if the drafters of the Reference Paper had meant to ban cartels, they
would certainly have mentioned it,154 whereas others submit that the Panel correctly
found price-fixing and market-sharing arrangements to be hard-core violations of
competition law within the scope of the Paper.155
It is, in any case, questionable whether the Panel or the Appellate Body (or any
Court156) are proper fora for resolving intricate telecommunications-specific or
antitrust issues. We should bear in mind that, ``[t]he primary responsibility to clarify
and improve the Reference Paper rests with the WTO membership, at the negotiating
table. The same is true for the elaboration of competition law principles. If the WTO
membership fails to assume this responsibility, dispute settlement on the basis of the
Reference Paper remains a second-best solution to make the necessary progress''.157
III. THE WTO LAW ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the European Communities158 and
their Member States are Members of the WTO and signatories to the Agreements
153 See, e.g., the European Commission's position expressed in its Guidelines on market analysis and the
assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services, OJ C 165/6, 11 July 2002.
154 Marsden, as note 142 above, at pp. 8±9. See also Kathy Y. Lee, The WTO Dispute Settlement and Anti-
Competitive Practices: Lessons from Trade Disputes, University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy
Working Paper (L) 10/05 (2005), at pp. 30 et seq.
155 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 540; Fox, as note 142 above.
156 See Trinko, as note 136 above.
157 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 552. See, also, Armin von Bogdany, ``Law and Politics in
the WTOÐStrategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship'', in Jochen A. Frowein and RuÈdiger Wolfrum (eds),
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 5 (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), pp. 609±674. The
question is not straightforward even in the realm of the EC, which constitutes a supranational entity. For an
analysis, see Burri Nenova, as note 6 above, at ch. 4.
158 Both the European Communities and all the Member States of the European Union are full Members of
the WTO. It is clear from Articles IX, XI and XIV of the WTO Agreement, that it is the European Communities,
and not the European Community or the European Union, which is a Member of the WTO. The explanation for
this peculiarity can be found in EU constitutional law. The European Communities, and not the European
Community, is a WTO Member since at the time of the negotiations it was unclear which of the then three
Communities (European Economic Community, European Community for Coal and Steel and Euratom) had the
necessary competence to conclude the WTO Agreement. In Opinion 1/94 ([1995] I CMLR 205; [1994] ECR I-
5267) the European Court of Justice established that only the European Community needed to be involved in the
WTO. However, the ECJ's clarification of the legal situation came after the WTO Agreement had been signed.
The European Union is not a WTO Member, since in 1994, at the time of the conclusion of the WTO
Agreement, it had no competence to conclude international agreements.
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adopted within its framework.159 As such, they are bound by these documents as part of
the international legal order. The law of the European Community is accordingly
influenced by the law of the WTO. To what extent will be briefly discussed below,
since the status of the EC's commitments is of importance to the EC communications
regulatory framework and to our objective of correlating the two regimes.
A. EFFECT(S) OF THE WTO LAW ON THE EC LEGAL ORDER
WTO law neither obliges the Members to impose ``direct effect''160 in their
domestic legal system, nor elaborates upon this effect.161 It is for the domestic law to
establish concrete parameters of the relationship between WTO law and domestic
law.162 In the EC context, the final Recital of the Council Decision adopting the WTO
Agreements of the Uruguay Round states that, ``. . . by its nature, the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not
susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts''.163
Despite the clarity of the latter statement, the question of the effect of WTO law on the
Community's legal system is far from straightforward and is, in any case, much
disputed.164
159 See Council Decision 94/800/EC, as note 13 above. At that time, only 12 countries were Members of the
EC, namely: Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Greece and the United Kingdom. The EC goods and services schedules apply to these countries, whereas there are
schedules under their own names for the countries which joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland, Sweden) and
for the 10 countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia), which joined in May 2004.
160 The term ``direct effect'' is used here in the sense that a private person may base a claim in the domestic
courts (national or EC) against another private party or the State based on the State's obligations existing under an
international Treaty. Other terms used often as synonyms for ``direct effect'' or with subtle differences are ``direct
applicability'', ``invocability'' and/or ``self-executing effect''. On the definition of ``direct effect'', see, e.g., Helen
Keller, Rezeption des VoÈlkerrechts (Berlin: Springer, 2003), at pp. 13 et seq.
161 There is one exception, namely Article XX:2 of the Agreement on Government Procurement, which
provides for judicial review based on the agreement. See Panel Report, United StatesÐSections 301±310 of the Trade
Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, 22 December 1999.
162 Thomas Cottier, ``A Theory of Direct Effect in Global Law, in Armin von Bogdany, Petros C. Mavroidis
and Yves MeÂny (eds), European Integration and International Co-ordination (The Hague, London and Boston:
Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 103.
163 Council Decision 94/800/EC, as note 13 above, at Recital 15.
164 See Thomas Cottier, as note 20 above; Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The
Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, 1 Journal of International Economic
Law (1998), 83±122; Cottier, as note 162 above; Steve Peers, ``Fundamental Right or Political Whim? WTO Law
and the Court of Justice'', in GraÂinne de BuÂrca and Joanne Scott (eds), The EU and the WTOÐLegal and
Constitutional Issues (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 111±130; Armin von Bogdany and
Tilman Makatsch, ``Collision, Co-existence or Co-operation? Prospects for the Relationship between WTO Law
and European Union Law'', in GraÂinne de BuÂrca and Joanne Scott (eds), The EU and the WTOÐLegal and
Constitutional Issues (Oxford/Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 131±150; Claus Dieter Ehlermann, ``On
the Direct Effect of the WTO Agreements'', in Talia Einhorn (ed.), Spontaneous Order, Organization and the Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 413 et seq.; Cottier and Oesch, as note 16 above, at pp. 197 et
seq.; Armin von Bogdany, Legal Effects of World Trade Organization Decisions Within European Union Law: A
Contribution to the Theory of the Legal Acts of International Organizations and the Action for Damages under Article 288(2)
EC, 39 Journal of World Trade 1 (February 2005), 45±66; Daniel WuÈger, Anwendbarkeit und JustiziabilitaÈt
voÈlkerrechtlicher Normen im schweizerischen Recht: Grundlagen, Methoden und Kriterien (Berne: Staempfli, 2005); Pieter
Jan Kuijper and Marco Bronckers, WTO Law in the European Court of Justice, 42 Common Market Law Review
(2005), 1313±1355.
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The direct effect of GATT 1947 was tested and rejected by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) in the International Fruit judgment.165 This position remained unchanged
after the establishment of the WTO and despite the development of the elaborate
system of dispute settlement.166 In Portugal v. Council, the ECJ considered that the
WTO Agreements were based on the ``principle of negotiation'',167 which
distinguished them from other international agreements that were recognized as
having direct effect. The Court noted further that the major trading partners of the EC
had not given direct effect to the multilateral agreements, and such an effect granted by
the EC would effectively disadvantage the Community in future negotiations.168 The
Court concluded therefore that, ``. . . having regard to their nature and structure, the
WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is
to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions''.169
This negative view of the Court's decisions by no means suggests that the WTO
law is irrelevant within the EC legal order. Quite the contrary: first, there is the general
principle of pacta sunt servanda, as expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of the Treaties.170 Pursuant to it, ``every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. No State may invoke the
provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to perform an international
treaty''.171 In that sense, Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement obliges each Member
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.172
Second, Article 300(7) of the EC Treaty implies that international agreements
enjoy supremacy over the Community's secondary law and the law of the Member
States.173 ``[The law of the WTO] is consequently endowed with the power to derogate
national law and must be taken into account by Community authorities in the creation
and interpretation of secondary law.''174
165 Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV v. Produktshap voor groenten en fruit [1972] ECR
1219, [1975] 2 CMLR 1, at paras 21 et seq.
166 See note 20 above.
167 Case C-146/96, Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395, at para. 42, confirmed recently by Case C-377/
02, LeÂon Van Parijs v. Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutie Bureau, judgment of 1 March 2005, nyr.
168 Ibid., at paras 43 et seq. For the US counterpart rejecting direct effect of the WTO Agreements, see
Section 102(a) of the US Implementing Bill, The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 103D Congress, 2nd Session,
House Document 103-316, Vol. 1, 1994, 659.
169 Ibid. at para. 47. See also Joined Cases C-390/98 and 392/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. TUK
Consultancy BV and Asco GeruÈste and Rob Van Dijk v. Wilhelm GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV [2000] ECR I-
11304.
170 See note 151 above.
171 Ibid. at Article 27. On the principle of good faith, see Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in WTO Jurisprudence
(Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2006).
172 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, BrazilÐExport Financing Programme for Aircraft (Recourse by Canada to
Article 21.5 of the DSU), WT/DS46/AB/RW, 21 July 2000. There, at para. 46, the AB stated that, ``a WTO
Member's domestic law does not excuse that Member from fulfilling its international obligations''.
173 Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany (International Dairy Agreement) [1996] ECR I-3989. See also von
Bogdany, as note 164 above, at pp. 50 et seq.
174 Cottier and Oesch, as note 16 above, at p. 200.
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Third, the law of the WTO affects the European legal order through the principle
of consistent interpretation.175 As the ECJ noted in International Dairy Agreement,176
where the EC had entered into an international agreement, the provisions of secondary
Community legislation ``must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is
consistent with those agreements''.177 In HermeÁs International v. FHT Marketing,178 the
Court held further that national courts, when interpreting a Community measure that
falls within the scope of a WTO agreement, must apply national legislation ``as far as
possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose'' of the agreement.179 As the WTO
rules are often more detailed than the existing national provisions, ``they provide ample
guidance as to the proper interpretation of national law''180 and could thus have
considerable influence.
Finally, there are two constellations in which the WTO law has been granted
direct effect, as found in Fediol181 and Nakajima.182 In these two cases, the ECJ stated
that the GATT 1947 rules could have direct effect where (i) the adoption of the
measures implementing obligations assumed within the context of the GATT is at issue
and (ii) where a Community measure refers expressly to specific provisions of GATT.
This specific applicability was confirmed with respect to the WTO Agreements in the
judgment of Petrotub of 9 January 2003,183 as well as in the Microsoft decision of 2004.184
Considering the foregoing, one could conclude that the WTO law has generally
been denied direct effect in the EC legal order and Member States are presently without
the possibility of bringing action against the acts of the EC institutions violating WTO
provisions.185 Likewise, individuals cannot bring actions against States.186 Nonetheless, the
175 See, e.g., Cottier and Schefer, as note 164 above, at pp. 88 et seq.
176 Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany (International Dairy Agreement), as note 173 above.
177 Ibid., at para. 52.
178 Case C-53/96, HermeÁs International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603.
179 Ibid., at para. 28 (emphasis added).
180 Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch, WTO Law, Precedents and Legal Change, 3 Turku Law Journal
(2001), 34.
181 Case 70/87, FeÂdeÂration de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission [1989] ECR 1781.
182 Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co Ltd v. Council [1991] ECR I-2069. Confirmed also in Case C-
280/93, Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I-4973. On the Fediol and Nakajima cases, see Kuijper and Bronckers, as
note 164 above, at pp. 1323 et seq.
183 Case C-76/00 P, Petrotub SA and Republica SA v. Council [2003] ECR 79, in particular at para. 54. For a
different view, see Kuijper and Bronckers, as note 164 above, at pp. 1326±1327.
184 Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, Case
COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, C(2004) 900 final. At para. 1053, the Commission stated that, `` . . `[i]t is only where
the Community intended to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the
Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Court to
review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules'. In this case, these
conditions are not satisfied and Microsoft can therefore not invoke the TRIPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement
to challenge the legality of this Decision'' (footnotes omitted).
185 In the context of Article 230(2) EC.
186 See the ECJ judgment in Dior (as note 169 above). One should, however, note that in its recent judgment
in the Biret cases, the ECJ left open the possibility of an action for damages based on an EC measure, which was
found to be inconsistent with the WTO obligations by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body if the damage occurred
after the end of the reasonable period of time for implementation of the ruling of the DSB. See Judgment of the
Court of 30 September 2003, Biret International SA v. Council, Case C-93/02 P, and Judgment of the Court of 30
September 2003, Biret International SA v. Council, Case C-94/02 P. For a comment, see Armin von Bogdany, supra
note 164.
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effect of the WTO law on the European legal environment is profound with ``elements
not only of collision, but also of peaceful coexistence and even cooperation''.187
B. SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES
Having discussed the WTO instruments applicable to telecommunications
services and their effect upon the EC legal order, it is essential to know to what
extent the European Communities and their Member States have committed
themselves in the field.
Upon examination, the EC Schedule of Specific Commitments188 reveals an
almost full commitment of the Community regarding both basic and value-added
telecommunications services, including a commitment to the Reference Paper. The
few restrictions are limited to one or two Member States, and most of them have
already expired. Only one sub-sector remains beyond the scope of commitments; this
is, in terms of the W/120 classification, ``enhanced/value-added facsimile services,
including store and forward, store and retrieve''. No MFN exemptions regarding
telecommunications have been made.
A specific characteristic of the EC Schedule is the inclusion of an additional
clarification to the definition of telecommunications services. The emphasis of this
clarification is on the exclusion of broadcasting189 from the scope of the commitments,
so that they ``do not cover the economic activity consisting of content provision which
require telecommunications services for its transport. The provision of that content,
transported via a telecommunications service, is subject to the specific commitments
undertaken by the European Union and their Member States in other relevant
sectors''.190 This peculiarity reflects a heated political discussion and has to do with the
willingness of the EC to keep the audiovisual sector out of the overall liberalization
commitments for the sake of protecting certain cultural values.191
187 von Bogdany and Makatsch, as note 164 above, at p. 150.
188 European Communities and their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Trade in Services,
Supplement 3, GATS/SC/31/Suppl. 3, 11 April 1997.
189 Broadcasting being defined as ``the uninterrupted chain of transmission required for the distribution of
TV and radio programme signals to the general public, but not covering contribution links between operators''.
190 European Communities and their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments, Trade in Services,
Supplement 3, as note 188 above, at p. 2.
191 See, e.g., Lisa L. Garrett, Commerce versus Culture: The Battle Between the United States and the European Union
Over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (1994),
553 et seq.; Jonas M. Grant, ``Jurassic'' Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of the Audiovisual Sector from GATT, 70 Indiana
Law Journal (1995), 1333 et seq.; Judith Beth Prowda, US Dominance in the ``Marketplace of Culture'' and the French
``Cultural Exception'', 29 New York Journal of International Law and Politics (1996±97), 193 et seq.; Ivan Bernier,
``Cultural Goods and Services in International Trade Law'', in Dennis Browne (ed.), The Culture/Trade Quandary:
Canada's Policy Options (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1998), pp. 108 et seq.; Mary E. Footer and
Christoph Beat Graber, Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy, 3 Journal of International Economic Law (2000),
115 et seq.; Bruno de Witte, ``Trade in Culture: International Legal Regimes and EU Constitutional Values'', in
GraÂinne de BuÂrca/Joanne Scott (eds), The EU and the WTOÐLegal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford and Portland,
OR: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 237±255; Patrick A. Messerlin, Stephen E. Siwek and Emmanuel Cocq, The
Audiovisual Services Sector in the GATS Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2004);
Christoph Beat Graber, Michael Girsberger and Mira Nenova (eds), Free Trade versus Cultural Diversity: WTO
Negotiations in the Field of Audiovisual Services (Zurich: Schulthess, 2004); and in particular, Graber, as note 28 above.
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In the context of the ongoing Doha Round of negotiations192 and the request-
offer mechanism,193 the initial conditional offer of the European Communities194 made
only few changes to the commitments outlined above.195 The offer of the EC revised in
2005 196 however has significant novelties. These are not necessarily further-reaching
commitments, although certain new commitments have been made (e.g.,
telecommunications services have been excluded from multiple limitations on
horizontal commitments and differences in committing between Member States have
been reduced). The novelties are mainly in the terminology used for categorizing
telecommunications services.197 The existing ``basic versus value-added'' dichotomy
has been abandoned and a new delineation has been adopted. This novel approach of
the EC is symptomatic of the changes within the Community regulatory regime for
electronic communications and is elaborated below in section III.C.3.
C. WTO TELECOMMUNICATIONS RULES VIS-AÁ-VIS EC TELECOMMUNICATIONS RULES
Now that we have taken stock of the WTO telecommunications rules and the
commitments of the European Communities, it is interesting to consider how,
precisely, this body of law correlates with the EC electronic communications regime
and whether they create a harmonious or a discordant pair. The first step in this analysis
is a brief introduction to the core principles of EC communications law. This will be
followed by a discussion of arguments demonstrating harmony (section III.C.2.) and
arguments exposing discord (section III.C.3.).
192 WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, 14 November 2001.
193 Our analysis here focuses only on the offers of the European Communities. In terms of requests, in their
proposal for commitments in the field of telecommunications services, the EC hopes for reciprocal commitments
in the sector and suggests that all Members commit for Modes 1 (cross-border supply), 2 (consumption abroad)
and 3 (commercial presence) all sub-sectors and all modes without restrictions, including as an additional
commitment the Reference Paper in its entirety. Improvement and facilitation of the temporary movement of
natural persons are suggested under Mode 4 (presence of natural persons) and elimination of the Members' MFN
exemptions related to satellite services and accounting rates. See Communication from the European Communities
and their Member States, GATS 2000: Telecommunications, S/CSS/W/35, 22 December 2000 and
Communication from Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Hong Kong China, Korea,
Norway, Singapore, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kimmen and Matsu and the United
States, TN/SW/50, 1 July 2005.
194 Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Conditional Initial Offer, TN/
S/O/EEC, 10 June 2003, at pp. 80-84.
195 The existing limitations on market access with regard to certain Member States were substantially
reduced. Full commitments are also offered in the previously not covered sub-sector of ``enhanced/valued-added
facsimile services, including store and forward, store and retrieve''. The additional definition for
telecommunications in the sense of exclusion of broadcasting was preserved as such.
196 For the Doha Round of negotiations in services, between 31 March 2003 and 15 September 2005,
69 initial offers were submitted. From 19 May 2005 to 8 November 2005, Members submitted 30 revised offers
(Australia, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Egypt, European Communities and
its Member States, Honduras, Hong Kong China, Iceland, India, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Macao China,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Singapore, Suriname, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United States and
Uruguay).
197 Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Conditional Revised Offer,
TN/S/O/EEC/Rev.1, 29 June 2005, in particular at pp. 187±214 and Attachment C.
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1. Main Tenets of EC Communications Law
EC communications law could be characterized by its unique multi-level and
``multifarious''198 structure. It is a complex system, within which several bodies of law
have to be considered. These comprise: (i) the EC competition rules;199 (ii) the
communications sector specific regulation; and (iii) the obligations of the European
Communities as party to the WTO Agreements, which were highlighted above. In
addition, the level of national legislation of the Member States implementing the EC
primary and secondary law is also relevant.200
In the following sections, we shall focus on the EC communications specific
regime, first, owing to the obvious space constraints of the paper and secondly and
more importantly, since Community rules take precedence over the national ones201
and are directly applicable.202 Under the present EC specific regime for electronic
communications, we mean the framework put in place in 2002 and its 2007 update203
building upon the foundations and the achievements of the 1998 regulatory package,
which ``managed'' the process of liberalization and re-regulation of European
telecommunications markets.204 The 2002 regime consists of one Framework
Directive,205 four Specific Directives206 (adopted by the Council and the European
Parliament) and one Commission Directive.207 It covers the regulation of electronic
198 An expression used by Ian Walden. See Ian Walden, ``Telecommunications Law and Regulation: An
Introduction'', in Ian Walden and John Angel (eds), Telecommunications Law and Regulation (2nd edn, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 13.
199 As established by Commission Decision of 10 December 1982, British Telecom, OJ 1987 L 360/36, [1987]
1 CMLR 457; confirmed in Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission (British Telecommunications) [1985] ECR 873, [1985] 2
CMLR 368.
200 For an account of national competition law legislation, see Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th edn,
London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003), pp. 57 et seq. For an account of national communications specific legislation,
see Colin D. Long (general ed.), Global Telecommunications Law and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000±04).
201 See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR 425; Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v.
Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, [1969] CMLR 100.
202 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlanse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; Case 43/75,
Defrenne v. Sabena (II) [1976] ECR 455. See also Recitals 8 and 9 and Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003
on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, see note 200 above.
203 The current framework has been in force since 24 April 2002. Member States were given until 24 July
2003 to adopt and publish the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with it. For the
2007 update, see European Commission, Communication on the review of the EU regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, COM (2006) 334 final, 29 June 2006.
204 For an excellent analysis of the 1998 EC framework, see Larouche, as note 132 above.
205 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (hereinafter the Framework Directive),
OJ L 108/33, 24 April 2002.
206 Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the
authorization of electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108/21 24 April 2002; Directive 2002/19/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of,
electronic communications networks and associated facilities (hereinafter the Access Directive); Directive 2002/22/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating
to electronic communications networks and services (hereinafter the Universal Service Directive); Directive 2002/
58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data
and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.
207 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic
communications networks and services, OJ L 249/21, 17 September 2002 (hereinafter the Commission
Competition Directive).
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communications services, electronic communications networks, associated facilities
and associated services.208 This means, in essence, that it applies to all transmission
networks and services, including broadcasting networks and the Internet,209 which
were previously not part of the telecommunications regulation.210
The underlying objective of the 2002 regulatory framework was to meet the
challenges of convergence and ensure sustainable competition under the new
technological and post-liberalization market conditions.211 In the pursuit of this
objective, the EC defined a few novel regulatory principles and mechanisms. The core
elements of these can be identified (in random order) as follows:
(i) separation of content and networks in the regulatory scheme;
(ii) expansion of the regulatory scope and regulation of all networks and
transport-related services;
(iii) greater reliance on competition law rules as opposed to sectoral rules,
including new design of the sector specific regulation;
(iv) withdrawal of sector specific rules through market-by-market sunset clauses;
and
(v) pursuit of technological neutrality.
All of the above principles have essentially changed the nature and the structure of
the EC communications regime.212 It is now more flexible and the regulatory
intervention has been substantially reduced and refined. The Significant Market Power
(SMP) regime213 is perhaps the most revealing of the novelty and the reach of the
reform. The SMP mechanism, which is similar in function to the ``major supplier''
identification for applying ex ante definite asymmetric rules, has now been aligned with
EC competition law. This alignment means, above all, that the concept of SMP, which
208 For the definitions, see Article 2 of the Framework Directive.
209 The Commission's Competition Directive specifies (at Recital 7) that, the ``new definitions [of electronic
communications networks and services] are indispensable in order to take account of the convergence
phenomenon by bringing together under one single definition all electronic communications services and/or
networks which are concerned with the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic
means (i.e., fixed, wireless, cable television, satellite networks). Thus, the transmission and broadcasting of radio
and television programmes should be recognized as an electronic communication service and networks used for
such transmission and broadcasting should likewise be recognized as electronic communications networks''.
210 Hence, the new name ``electronic communications'' coined by the EC legislator, to replace
``telecommunications'' as used under the previous regulatory framework.
211 See European Commission, Towards a new framework for electronic communications infrastructure and
associated services: the 1999 Communications Review, COM(1999) 539 final, 10 November 1999.
212 For a full-scale analysis of the present EC regime for electronic communications, see, e.g., Nihoul and
Rodford, as note 129 above; and Koenig, Bartosch and Braun, as note 4 above.
213 See Articles 14±16 of the Framework Directive and Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the
assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services, OJ C 165/6, 11 July 2002. The 2002 SMP regime has been the subject
of some excellent studies. See Alexandre de Streel, The Integration of Competition Law Principles in the New European
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, 26 World Competition 3 (2003), 489±514; Martin Cave,
``Economic Aspects of the New Regulatory Regime for Electronic Communications Service'', in Pierre A.
Buigues and Patrick Rey (eds), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2004), pp. 27±41; Nihoul and Rodford, as note 129 above, at paras 3.213 et seq.; Tambiana MadieÂga,
Innovation and Market Definition under the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, 29 World
Competition 1 (2006), 55±72.
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was previously rather mechanically bound to a market share of 25 percent of the
telecommunications operators,214 is now linked to the concept of dominance, as
formulated by the law and practice of the European courts. Thus, pursuant to Article 14
of the Framework Directive, ``an undertaking shall be deemed to have significant
market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position
equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors customers and
ultimately consumers''. 215
The actual application of the SMP rules and the finding of dominance follow the
standard antitrust methodology of market definition216 and examination of the
competitive constraints upon undertakings active in these markets.217 If an undertaking
is found to be in a dominant position in a certain electronic communications market,
that market is deemed not to be effectively competitive. The national regulatory
authorities (NRAs), which are in charge of applying the SMP mechanism under the
supervision of the European Commission,218 must subsequently impose appropriate
specific regulatory obligations upon the dominant undertaking (or undertakings)
chosen from the options provided in the Access Directive and in the Universal Service
Directive. The available remedies encompass transparency; non-discrimination;
accounting separation; obligations for access to and use of specific network facilities
and price control and cost accounting, and could be flexibly designed by the NRAs
(with a minimum of one remedy).219 Conversely, if the market is found to be
effectively competitive, the NRA must withdraw any obligation that may be in place
and should not impose a new obligation.220
214 See note 139 above.
215 This corresponds precisely to the definition given by the European Court of Justice. See e.g. Case 27/76,
United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, at para. 65; Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Commission [1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, at para. 38.
216 After an initial market selection made by the European Commission in a Recommendation. As made
clear by Article 15(1) of the Framework Directive, which is the legal basis of the Commission's Recommendation,
it identifies `` . . those product and service markets within the electronic communications sector, the characteristics
of which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set out in the Specific Directives,
without prejudice to markets that may be defined in specific cases under competition law''. For the current
Recommendation, see Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC, OJ L 114/
45, 8 May 2003.
217 Because of the ex ante nature of the analysis, there are some differences in comparison to an analysis under
Article 82 EC. Most notably, there is a difference in the perspective of the analysis, which is a forward-looking one.
There is furthermore no need for finding an abuse as would normally be required under antitrust. See note 213
above.
218 There is a special procedure ensuring coordination between the national and the Community levels. This
procedure is formulated in Article 7 of the Framework Directive and allows the Commission to veto certain key
measures of the NRAs. Of the 229 cases assessed by the Commission up to 30 September 2005, it adopted veto
decisions in only four cases. See European Commission, Communication on market reviews under the EU
regulatory framework: Consolidating the internal market for electronic communications, COM(2006) 28 final,
6 February 2006.
219 On the imposition of remedies, see Article 16 of the Framework Directive, Articles 9±13 of the Access
Directive and Articles 17±19 of the Universal Service Directive. See also Martin Cave, ``An Economic Analysis of
Remedies in Network Industries'', in Damien Geradin (ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs.
Sector-Specific Regulation (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004), pp. 1±19.
220 Article 16 of the Framework Directive.
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The above process is repeated periodically to ensure that the obligations are
adapted to the market evolution and in the hope that ultimately, all sector specific
obligations will be withdrawn and competition law will become, similarly to other
economic sectors, the sole regulatory mechanism. One can thus conclude that the
current EC sectoral regime for electronic communications is a sui generis hybrid
regulatory model (in the sense that sectoral rules are based on antitrust law and
practice), also containing a mechanism for gradual withdrawal of the sectoral regulation.
2. Harmony
The WTO telecommunications rules and the EC regime, although they are
separate bodies of law with different natures and at different levels, are both influenced
and defined by the specific characteristics and the development of telecommunications
markets. They have evolved in parallel and reflect the common underlying objective of
liberalizing telecommunications. That the date of entry into force of the EC Full
Competition Directive and of the Fourth Protocol was the same221 is not a
coincidence. Indeed, one of the reasons for the success of the EC liberalization
endeavour in the telecommunications sector in the 1990s222 was the affirmation of this
liberalization trend at the global level and the inclusion of telecommunications in
international trade law.
Following this pattern of development, the 2002 electronic communications
package would appear to be in line with the law of the WTO and the commitments
made by the EC under its framework,223 because they were essentially created in
parallel.224 Indeed, the EC communications instruments may be a good example of the
above-mentioned ``peaceful coexistence and cooperation''225 between the two regimes.
A first sign of this cooperation is that the EC telecommunications rules often make
explicit reference to the commitments of the Community in the context of the WTO
(for instance, in Recital 29 of the Framework Directive, Recital 3 of the Universal
Service Directive, Article 8(3) of the Access Directive and in paragraphs 116 and 125 of
the Commission Guidelines on market analysis and assessment of significant market
power226). Furthermore, in terms of content, the principles introduced at the
Community level are consistent with those of the WTO. The key concepts of
``interconnection'', ``non-discrimination'', ``transparency'' and ``reasonable terms and
conditions'', as contained in GATS, the Annex on Telecommunications and the
Reference Paper are reflected in the rules of the EC framework.227 A relevant example
221 See section II.C. above
222 See Fifth Report on the implementation of the telecommunications regulatory package, COM(1999) 537
final, 10 November 1999.
223 See Nihoul and Rodford, as note 129 above, at paras 3.388±3.394, 4.375±4.378, 5.349.
224 See note 119 above.
225 See note 187 above.
226 Note 213 above.
227 For an excellent account of the EC implementation, see Clough, as note 33 above, at pp. 59±85.
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is that the Telmex Panel Report relied on the EC definition of ``interconnection'', as
contained in Article 2(b) of the Access Directive.228
A more concrete instance of the cooperation between the two regimes is the key
concept of ``major supplier''. The latter is explicitly included in the EC framework.
The Commission Guidelines on market analysis state that: ``[t]he EC and its Member
States have given commitments in the WTO in relation to undertakings that are `major
suppliers' of basic telecommunications services. Such undertakings are subject to all of
the obligations set out in the EC's and its Member States' commitments in the WTO
for basic telecommunications services. The provisions of the new regulatory
framework, in particular relating to access and interconnection, ensure that national
regulatory authorities (NRAs) continue to apply the relevant obligations to
undertakings that are major suppliers in accordance with the WTO commitments of
the EC and its Member States''.229
The definition of a ``major supplier'' in the Reference Paper, which is ``framed in
`competition law' terms, that is generally, by reference to relatively indeterminate
notions'',230 (such as control over essential facilities or use of the undertaking's position
in the market) appears to connect well to the formulation of significant market power
under the current EC communications regime, as sketched above. Paul Nihoul and
Robert Rodford define this consistency between the WTO and the European rules as a
``triple consistency'', since (i) the obligations imposed on markets and relating to access,
and/or interconnection, are similar in the two bodies of the law; (ii) these obligations
must be imposed, depending on the case, on the same undertakings, that is, those
which, as a result of their market power, may influence market conditions; and (iii) the
definition given to ``major supplier'' in the Reference Paper is identical for the
regulatory sector specific principles introduced in the Paper, and for the competition
rules formulated therein.231
We argue however that there may be some ``loopholes'' in this ``triple
consistency''. We have mentioned that the test of identifying a ``major supplier'',
albeit inspired by antitrust rationales, seems to require less market power than the test of
dominance under EC competition law.232 Consequently, although it could be
maintained that in most situations the Community framework for electronic
communications (in particular the application of the SMP regime) will lead to an
outcome consistent with the international trade rules, the possibility that divergence
may occur cannot be excluded. Article 8(3)(vii) of the Access Directive is a proof of this
hypothesis.233 It covers situations in which an undertaking will not qualify as having
228 See Panel Report, MexicoÐTelecommunications Services, as note 50 above, at para. 7.111.
229 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications, as note 226 above.
230 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at p. 26.
231 Nihoul and Rodford, as note 129 above, at para. 3.394.
232 Clough, as note 33 above, at p. 67. See also Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, pp. 535 et seq. and
569.
233 Although it does not give a specific explanation as to when such a divergence between the concepts of
major supplier and SMP operator might occur in practice.
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significant market power within the meaning of Articles 1416 of the Framework
Directive but would still fall within the ``major supplier'' category. In such cases, the
NRAs will, exceptionally, impose sector specific obligations upon these undertakings
in order to be in line with the Reference Paper commitments of the Community.
Thus, one can conclude that the ``harmonious'' relationship between the EC
communications rules related to control of market power and those of the WTO is
ultimately secured by a special sectoral rule serving as a ``safety-net''.
Furthermore, it is possible that the WTO commitments of the EC, without being
in discord with the European framework, would curb certain aspects of its flexibility.
The choice of remedies imposed on SMP operator(s) (that would also qualify as ``major
supplier''), for instance, might be limited. Under the Reference Paper,234 Members are
obliged to ensure that major suppliers grant interconnection to other operators at cost-
oriented rates, whereas under the Community regime, NRAs have the discretion in
that regard and may or may not impose cost-orientation according to their judgment of
adequacy of the measure for the case at issue.235 This reduction in the flexibility of the
EC regulatory framework is unfortunate, since the pursuit of more flexibility to
respond to new situations and less stringent regulatory intervention was the very reason
for its review in 2002.
3. Discord
As discussed in section II of this article, the telecommunications specific
framework within the law of the WTO has some peculiar characteristics. We argue
that these may have far-reaching implications for the development of international trade
in communications and, as we shall see below, could come to be in discord with some
of the positions of the current EC electronic communications regulation and its future
design, in particular.
(a) Basic versus value-added telecommunications services
The first such peculiarity is the built-in division between basic and value-added
telecommunications services that runs through all provisions of the WTO
telecommunications regime, as discussed above. Building upon the W/120 services
classification model,236 the schedules of commitments listed certain categories of
telecommunications services as basic or value-added without giving explicit definitions.
The W/120 categorization was furthermore inconsistently applied and there are
substantial variations among the Members in the implementation of the categorization.
This is first, because of the flexibility of the schedules model adopted for basic
234 Reference Paper, at Section 2.2(b).
235 See note 219 above.
236 See note 48 above.
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telecommunications, which authorizes further distinction between local/long distance/
international, wire or radio-based, public or non-public, resale or facility-based
services237 and second, because some countries have introduced additional
technological distinctions (e.g., satellite/non-satellite, mobile/fixed). Moreover, some
of the definitions used have relied upon as yet unadopted internal legislation or non-
explicit (or non-existent) internal definitions. In view of the above, a striking
characteristic of the separation between basic and value-added telecommunications
services is the lack of a clear criterion and coherent application of this distinction.238
With hindsight, one could qualify the basic value-added delineation as a temporary
solution. It was a helpful shortcut for facilitating negotiations, which allowed for
gradual liberalization of the telecommunications sector. In the aftermath, however, the
distinction between basic and value-added telecommunications services has not proved
auspicious and justifies the assessment of Bronckers and Larouche as having been rather
``unfortunately introduced in the GATS framework''.239 Today, the basic/value-added
separation has lost its relevance since the majority of the basic telecommunications
markets have already been liberalized. It is in fact more confusing than helpful240 and
limits the application of the Reference Paper, which addresses only basic
telecommunications services. It is discordant with the absence of such classification
under the EC communications framework and contrary to the pressing need for
convergence-conform and technologically neutral solutions.
(b) Telecommunications versus audiovisual services
Another distinction with unfortunate regulatory repercussions in the face of
rapidly developing communications markets and multiple overlaps between content
and infrastructure is that between telecommunications and audiovisual services.
Although this vertical sectoral separation made perfect sense when it was adopted at the
outset of the services negotiations,241 it has become rather awkward in an environment
of progressive convergence.242 The existing rigid W/120 delimitation for
237 Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, GATS 2000:
Telecommunications, as note 193 above, at para. 6.
238 Luff, as note 33 above, at p. 38. For a comprehensive analysis of the definition and scheduling methods
and the lack of consistency, see Communication from the European Communities and its Member States,
Classification in the Telecom Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework, TN/S/W/27, S/CSC/W/44,
10 February 2005, at paras 3±13.
239 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 10 above, at p. 16 (emphasis added). The authors point out further in an
updated contribution that, ``[t]his distinction . . may cause complications, and may have outlived its usefulness
given that no substantive consequences are attached to the distinction. It could be eliminated from the GATS
framework''. See Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 526.
240 See Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Classification in the
Telecom Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework, as note 238 above, at paras 9±13.
241 The category ``Communications Services'', one of the 12 categories in the Services Sectoral Classification
List (as note 48 above), is subdivided into five categories: postal services, courier services, telecommunications
services, audiovisual services and other.
242 This has been largely acknowledged in the current negotiations. See, e.g., Communication from Switzerland,
GATS 2000: Audio-Visual Services, S/CSS/W/74, 4 May 2001, at para. 2.
WTO LAW AND COMMUNICATIONS LAW OF THE EC 869
``telecommunications services''243 and ``audiovisual services''244 lacks a clear criterion.
Furthermore, the sub-headings of audiovisual services are too broad,245 lumping
together services related to sound/music and visual content (no distinction is made, for
instance, between music and multimedia applications).246 It is thus difficult to classify
some new services (e.g., video-on-demand) under either category.247 On the other
hand, certain Internet services could fit under both and be categorized as either
audiovisual, telephony, packet-switched or circuit-switched data transmission services,
depending on the particular case. There are also a number of information technology
services prone to convergences that complicate the picture.248 Online games, for
instance, could be fitted into computer and related services, value-added
telecommunications services, entertainment or audiovisual services.249
As a result of these definitional shortcomings, some services might not be able to
profit from the commitments made in the telecommunications sector because they
would be classified (inadequately) as broadcasting.250 While it is debatable whether the
Reference Paper applies to basic telecommunications only or to value-added services as
well,251 it definitely does not cover audiovisual services. Neither does the Annex on
Telecommunications. Such limitations diminish the effectiveness of the
telecommunications instruments in a convergence environment and leave some
content-related but genuinely transport communications services outside the scope of
their provisions.
Within the EC communications framework, the implementation of regulatory
distinction between content and networks was found to be the appropriate response to
convergence.252 The current EC regime regulates only the latter, while the former
243 See section II.A. above.
244 There is no general definition of audiovisual services but there is an enumeration of services in the W/120
classification list. Therein audiovisual services are classified in six sub-sectors as: motion picture and video tape
production and distribution; motion picture projection services; radio and television services; radio and television
transmission services; sound recording; and other services, such as dubbing services (translation of the soundtrack
of motion pictures and videotapes from one language to another). See Messerlin, Siwek and Cocq, as note 191
above, at pp. 2±3, and in particular Table 1 therein ``Audiovisual Services and Their Subcategories in the GATS''.
On the definition of audiovisual services, see also Nihoul, as note 51 above, at pp. 371±381.
245 Nihoul, note 51 above.
246 Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The WTO, The Internet and Trade in Digital Products (Oxford and Portland, OR:
Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 73; Luff, as note 22 above, at p. 1073.
247 See David Luff, International Trade Law and Broadband Regulation: Towards Convergence?, 3 Journal of
Network Industries (2002), 244±245 and 259; Luff, as note 22 above, at pp. 1078 et seq. See also Graber, as note 28
above.
248 On the difficulties of classifying digitally-delivered content products under the GATS, see Wunsch-
Vincent, as note 246 above, at pp. 70 et seq.
249 Ibid., at p. 71.
250 See, e.g., the case of satellites, as discussed by Paul Nihoul. Nihoul, as note 51 above, at p. 375.
251 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at pp. 534±535. Some of the new negotiation proposals do
suggest that the Reference Paper should apply to all telecommunications services. See, e.g., Communication from
Colombia, Telecommunications Services, S/CSS/W/119, 27 November 2001.
252 See European Commission, Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and
information technology sectors, and the implications for regulation: Towards an Information Society approach,
COM(1997) 623, 3 December 1997 and the 1999 Communications Review, as note 211 above. On convergence,
see Colin R. Blackman, Convergence Between Telecommunications and Other Media, 22 Telecommunications Policy 3
(1998), 163±170; P.H. Longstaff, ``New Ways to Think about the Visions Called `Convergence': A Guide for
Business and Public Policy'', Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University (April 2000); OECD,
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content-related activities fall within the scope of the ``Television without Frontiers''
Directive.253 The content/networks separation, which clarifies the policy choices
regarding these two spheres of activity, is likely to remain unchanged and even to be
reinforced by the new EC Audiovisual Media Services Directive.254
Various aspects of this separation between content and networks/distribution
within the EC regulatory space conflict with the existing traditional
telecommunications/audiovisual division at the international level. It would be
interesting to see whether (and how) measures to address the convergence processes
will be taken up in the WTO framework. The discussion on these issues is intensified
from the EC perspective because the Community is particularly sensitive with regard to
content. It has consequently made no commitments in the audiovisual sector,255 has
scheduled a number of MFN exemptions therein256 and has declared no intention to
give these up, 257 with the purpose of safeguarding certain cultural policies.258
(c) Technological neutrality
Another issue of increasing significance rooted in the convergence phenomenon is
that of technological neutrality. The national and, consequently, the international
cont.
The Implications of Convergence for Regulation of Electronic Communications, DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2003)5/final, 12 July
2004; Damien Geradin and David Luff (eds), The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-
Visual Services (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially therein Milton L. Mueller,
``Convergence: A Reality Check'', pp. 311±322, and Pierre Larouche, ``Dealing with Convergence at the
International Level'', pp. 390±422.
253 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting
activities, OJ L 298/23, 17 October 1989, as amended by Directive 97/36/EC, OJ L 202/60, 30 July 1997.
254 See European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting
Activities (``Audiovisual Media Services without Frontiers''), COM(2007) 170 final, 29 March 2007.
255 In fact, few Members have made commitments for audiovisual services with varying intensity. For a
summary of the specific commitments, see Patrick A. Messerlin and Emmanuel Cocq, ``Preparing Negotiations in
Services: EC Audiovisuals in the Doha Round'', in Messerlin, Siwek and Cocq, as note 191, Table 7 at p. 33. See
also Martin Roy, Audiovisual Services in the Doha Round: Dialogue de Sourds, The Sequel?, Journal of World Investment
and Trade (2005), 923±952; and Wunsch-Vincent, as note 246 above, at pp. 96 et seq.
256 The currently scheduled MFN exemptions are: (i) redressive duties against unfair pricing practices by
distributors of audiovisual works (applying to all WTO Members); (ii) countermeasures against adverse, unfair or
unreasonable conditions or actions taken by other Members (applying to all WTO Members); (iii) extension of
national treatment to audio-visual works which meet certain linguistic and origin criteria regarding access to
broadcasting (applying to European countries); (iv) Extension of national treatment to audiovisual works covered
by co-production agreements (applying to all countries with whom an agreement may be concluded); (v) granting
of benefits of programmes such as MEDIA and EURIMAGES to works and suppliers meeting European origin
criteria (applying to European countries); 3 MFN exemptions for measures applied by specific Member States
(Spain, Italy, Nordic Countries). See WTO, European Communities and Their Member States: Final List of
Article II (MFN) Exemptions, GATS/EL/31, 15 April 1994.
257 See Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Conditional Initial Offer
(as note 194 above) and Conditional Revised Offer (as note 197 above). See also Council Resolution of 21 January
2002 on the development of the audiovisual services sector, OJ C 32/4, 5 February 2002. Recital 5 therein reads
that, ``during the forthcoming WTO negotiations the Union will ensure, as in the Uruguay Round, that the
Community and its Member States maintain the possibility to preserve and develop their capacity to define and
implement their cultural and audiovisual policies for the purpose of preserving their cultural diversity''.
258 See note 191 above.
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regulatory frameworks for telecommunications before liberalization (and particularly in
the ``pre-convergence'' era) were extensively based upon technological concepts, such
as fixed or mobile, cable or satellite communications. These concepts identified
different regimes and triggered different treatment of the related services. With the
rapid development of telecommunications technologies, however, and especially in the
face of convergence, these regulatory technological concepts have become outdated.
What is more, the idea of regulation based on strict technological concepts has been
strongly challenged. A response to this development has been the introduction in
domestic communications regimes of the principle of technological neutrality. This
principle prescribes ``non-discrimination'' of the underlying technologies when
regulatory decisions are taken259 and is considered to enable the ultimate selection of
the most efficient technology by the market.
The adoption of the principle of technological neutrality is a key one in the reform
of the EC communications regulation. The networks/content delineation, as
mentioned above, is one expression of it. In addition, as described earlier, the
European sector specific regulation has been aligned with competition law and has thus
moved away from the communications ``technicalities'' towards concepts of generic
economic regulation. This alignment with antitrust methodologies provides for
detachment from technical definitions and flexibility in reacting to new developments
within the electronic communications environment. Such alignment could thus also be
interpreted as a movement towards technological neutrality.
In contrast to these developments, the WTO law does not yet include any
technologically neutral tenets,260 although there has been a growing appreciation of this
need.261 An important step in this direction has been made through the USÐGambling
Report.262 It established, among other things, that the WTO and GATS rules are
applicable to electronically supplied services. It concluded notably, that
``mode 1 [cross-border supply] under the GATS encompasses all possible means of supplying services
from the territory of one WTO Member into the territory of another WTO Member.
Therefore, a market access commitment for mode 1 implies the right for other Members'
suppliers to supply a service through all means of delivery, whether by mail, telephone, Internet etc.,
unless otherwise specified in a Member's Schedule. We note that this is in line with the principle
of `technological neutrality', which seems to be largely shared among WTO Members.
Accordingly, where a full market access commitment has been made for mode 1, a prohibition
259 According to the 1999 Communications Review (as note 211 above), ``[t]echnological neutrality means
that legislation should define the objectives to be achieved, and should neither impose, nor discriminate in favour
of, the use of a particular type of technology to achieve those objectives''. See also the Framework Directive, at
Article 8(1).
260 On technological neutrality and the WTO, see Larouche, as note 252 above, at pp. 411±415.
261 See, e.g., Communication from the United States, Audiovisual and Related Services, S/CSS/W/21, 18
December 2000, at para. 10 and Communications from the United States, Market Access in Telecommunications and
Complementary Services: the WTO's Role in Accelerating the Development of a Globally Networked Economy, S/CSS/W/30,
18 December 2000, at para. 9.
262 See Panel Report, United StatesÐMeasures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/S285/R, 10 November 2004 (confirmed by the Appellate Body Report, United StatesÐMeasures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005).
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on one, several or all means of delivery included in this mode 1 would be a limitation on market
access for the mode''.263
Despite the above evolutionary interpretation of what the Panel defined as a
``means of delivery'',264 the incoherent system of technical definitions, both within the
GATS telecommunications instruments and especially, within the Members' schedules
has not really been overcome. Indeed, the very case of USÐGambling stressed the
crucial importance of the commitments listed in the Members' schedules and the
existence of a presumption that the structure and language of a schedule follow the
W/120 and CPC nomenclature.265
(d) Solutions?
The revised conditional offer of the European Communities and its Member
States266 for the Doha Round has boldly attempted to resolve the ``basic versus value-
added'' telecommunications dichotomy and to address (at least partly) the three points
of divergence outlined above. It has abandoned this delineation in its entirety and bases
its commitments upon the ``more comprehensive classification of telecom services as
found in the Annex on Telecommunications Services to the GATS''.267 The definition
of telecommunications services is hence to be ``the transmission and reception of signals
by any electromagnetic means''.268 The EC believes that:
``[s]uch a definition based on the functions performed would cover unmistakably all telecom services.
By putting such a definition in the first column of the schedule to identify the scope of services
that are considered to fall within the sector in a functional manner, WTO Members would
create greater legal certainty, and fall in line with the international consensus that regulators
should not discriminate between different technologies in providing services, between different
content being transmitted or between different business models''.269
In line with the above, the EC has completely changed its own schedule of
commitments and now includes in the first column simply ``Telecommunications
Services'' with no further categorization. These services are then defined as ``[a]ll
services consisting of the transmission and reception of signals by any electromagnetic
263 See Panel Report, USÐGambling, ibid., at para. 6.285 (emphases added; footnote omitted). See also
Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Cross-Border Trade in Services and the GATS: Lessons from the WTO US Internet Gambling
Case, Institute for International Economics Working Paper (December 2005), in particular at pp. 20 et seq.
264 ``The expression `means of delivery' will be used in this Report to refer to the various technological
means (mail, telephone, Internet, etc.) by which a service can be supplied cross-border or remotely. Unless
otherwise indicated, `cross-border' and `remote' supply cover all the various technological means of supplying
services''. See Panel Report, USÐGambling, ibid., at para. 6.33.
265 See Wunsch-Vincent, note 263 above, at pp. 16 et seq.; Markus Krajewski, Playing by the Rules of the
Game? Specific Commitments after USÐGambling and Betting and the Current GATS Negotiations, 32 Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 4 (2005), 427 et seq.
266 See note 197 above.
267 Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Classification in the Telecom
Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework, as note 238 above, at para. 1.
268 Section 3(a) of the Annex on Telecommunications.
269 Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Classification in the Telecom
Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework, as note 238 above, at para. 16 (emphasis in original). For a more
detailed argumentation, see ibid., at paras 17±26.
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means, excluding broadcasting''.270 The additional definition of broadcasting that
follows is preserved,271 while a new clarification in the sense that, ``[t]elecommuni-
cations services do not cover the economic activity consisting of the provision of
content services which require telecommunications services for their transport''272 has
been added. This solution proposed by the EC is undoubtedly a step towards abolishing
confusing definitions, and while maintaining the present level of commitments,273 it
allows for technological neutrality and flexibility.
The EC approach, although evolutionary and positively accounting for the
contemporary state of telecommunications, is however unlikely to succeed in the rather
conservative environment of trade negotiations. The opposition of the United States274
is the epitome of the more pragmatic attitude towards the trade discussions and
scheduling. The United States, while appreciating the efforts of the EC to clarify
telecommunications commitments, seems ``concerned about the EC's proposal because
of its potential to limit the scope of the telecommunications sector'',275 and more
specifically that it ``may add greater uncertainty into the sector with respect to value-
added services''.276 The United States argues that ``value-added'' services are an essential
component of the telecommunications services sector and that a classification scheme
that does not explicitly cover them may result in diminution of existing
commitments.277 The United States proposed an alternative to the EC definition,278
which ensures the inclusion of value-added telecom services but stressed that, ``if efforts
to address the problems with the EC approach highlighted here fail, it would be
preferable for all Members to continue to use the existing W/120 framework to
schedule commitments, rather than schedule under a new classification system''.279
In view of this, the three lines of discord between the EC communications
framework and the WTO telecommunications rules, as illustrated above, are likely to
persist. Indeed, if no changes in the realm of the WTO are made, the advance of
convergence and technological developments may exacerbate the discord. Subscribing
270 See note 197 above, at p. 187.
271 See note 189 above.
272 See note 197 above, at p. 188.
273 Communication from the European Communities and its Member States, Classification in the Telecom
Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework, as note 238 above, at paras 31 et seq. The Communication makes it
clear that the Reference Paper as an additional commitment is an issue separate from the classification. See ibid., in
particular at paras 1 and 31.
274 Communication from the United States, Classification in the Telecommunications Sector under WTO-
GATS Framework, TN/S/W/35, S/CSC/W/45, 22 February 2005.
275 Ibid., at para. 2.
276 Id.
277 Ibid., at paras 2 and 6±9.
278 In the opinion of the United States, such a definition could be: ``[a]ll services consisting of the
transmission and reception of signals by any electromagnetic means, alone or in combination with enhancing, storing,
forwarding, retrieving, or processing functions added to the transmission and reception of signals''. Ibid., at para. 9 (emphasis in
original).
279 Ibid., at para. 17. Indeed, none of the revised conditional offers (see note 196 above) adopts the proposed
EC classification. Although some of them do not explicitly mention value-added services (e.g., New Zealand,
Revised Conditional Offer, TN/S/O/NZL, Rev.1, 17 June 2005), the existing delineation and the W/120
classification are preserved.
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to a newer nomenclature, such as the updated UN Central Product Classification
(CPC 1.1),280 for the Doha Round commitments may have solved certain problems
and offered more convergence accommodating, technologically neutral solutions.281
But this would probably be just another piecemeal approach282 and would not
necessarily reflect the decisions taken at the EC level. The content related issues are, in
any case, likely to remain highly sensitive and the dichotomy of commitments in
audiovisual versus telecommunications services preserved.
(e) Lack of global competition rules
While the above definitional collisions could be related to the nature and structure
of the WTO Agreements and have implications not only for the EC, there is another
point of discord between the EC and the WTO regimes for telecommunications,
which is EC-specific and perhaps also the most vital for the development of EC
communications regulation. This last point of potential discord is two-pronged. It
relates firstly, to the lack of general competition rules on the international level and
secondly, to the lack of projected alignment of telecommunications regulation with
antitrust rules.
To recap, the EC regime envisages a phasing-out of the telecommunications
specific regulation. In essence, this means that if (and when) the necessary level of
effective competition in the EC electronic communications markets is achieved and the
sectoral regulation is withdrawn, this ``might prove incompatible with the EC's WTO
commitments since the regulatory principles contained in the Reference Paper are not
and cannot be aligned with an international competition law framework that presently
does not exist''.283 Upon the withdrawal of the sectoral telecom rules, the Community
will either need to preserve a provision similar to the ``safety-net'' of the Access
Directive,284 or rely on consistent interpretation in order to ensure conformity. The
questions of whether this would be sufficient, on the one hand, and a positive
development for the EC communications law, on the other, remain open.
280 The UN Central Product Classification (see note 49 above) has in fact been amended twice since the end
of the Uruguay Round. See CPC 1.0 (Central Product Classification ± Version 1.0, UN Statistical Papers, Series
M, No 77, 1998, Ver.1.1, E.98.XVII.5) and CPC 1.1 (Central Product Classification ± Version 1.1, UN Statistical
Papers, Series M, No 77, Ver.1.1, 2002, ESA/STAT/SERM/77/Ver.1.1).
281 Wunsch-Vincent, as note 246 above, at pp. 76 et seq.
282 Ibid. Wunsch-Vincent suggests alternatives based, for instance, on a negative list approach. See ibid., at
p. 79, referring also to Aaditya Mattoo and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Pre-Empting Protectionism in Services: The WTO
and Outsourcing, 7 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2004), 765±801.
283 Bronckers and Larouche, as note 33 above, at p. 569.
284 One may even argue that such a provision ensuring conformity with the WTO law and referring
explicitly to the EC commitments under the WTO framework will have direct effect, pursuant to the Nakajima
doctrine (as note 182 above).
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Although the complementarity between trade policy, domestic deregulation and
competition policy has been widely acknowledged,285 the developments on
competition policy within the WTO, which commenced at the Singapore
Ministerial Conference in 1996286 as part of the so-called ``Singapore issues''287
have led to few tangible results. Competition policy was part of the Doha
Development Agenda288 but was subsequently dropped due to lack of consensus.289
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to examine the advances of the Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy,290 the submitted
proposals and their possible impact291 or to engage in a more sophisticated debate of
whether the WTO is the appropriate forum for developing competition rules and
whether such rules can function at all.292 It is however important to stress in the
present context that firstly, the next steps in committing to competition rules in the
realm of the WTO are likely to be ``fairly modest''293 and that secondly, if such rules
on competition policy are drawn up, it is unlikely that they would ever be
comprehensive enough to be capable of addressing the complex communications-
specific antitrust cases. In the context of our analysis of the Telmex Panel decision, we
could further question the process of ``creation'' of these rules and ultimately,
whether they are the right ones.294
IV. CONCLUSION
The above discussion has shown that the WTO provides a comprehensive
framework of telecommunications rules that is essential to the development of the
communications industry, which by its very nature is transnational. We have also seen
285 See, e.g., Edward Iacobucci, Interdependence of Trade and Competition Policy, 21 World Competition 2
(1997), 5±33; FreÂdeÂric Jenny, ``Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Issues and Challenges'', in Roger
ZaÈch (ed.), Towards WTO Competition Rules (The Hague, London and Boston: Kluwer Law International/Berne:
Staempfli, 1999), pp. 13 et seq. See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
Exclusionary Anti-Competitive Practices, Their Effects on Competition and Development, and Analytical and Remedial
Mechanisms, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/4 (Geneva: United Nations, 2005).
286 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Conf. Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W, 13 December 1996. The
Singapore Declaration (at para. 20) mandated the establishment of ``a working group to study issues raised by
Members relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in
order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework''. On the development
since Singapore, see Marsden, as note 88 above, at pp. 59 et seq.
287 The Singapore Ministerial identified four rules that might be well suited for the development of new
multilateral disciplines. These were investment policies, competition polices, transparency in government
procurement and trade facilitation. See ibid. at paras 20±23.
288 Doha Ministerial Declaration, as note 192 above, in particular at paras 23±25.
289 WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/
579, 2 August 2004, at para. (g).
290 See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General
Council (2003), WT/WGTCP/7, 17 July 2003.
291 For an excellent critical analysis, see Marsden, as note 88 above, at pp. 161 et seq.
292 See Marsden, ibid., at pp. 192 et seq.
293 Merit E. Janow, ``Trade and Competition Policy'', in Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton and
Michael G. Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Vol. III (New York:
Springer, 2005), p. 508.
294 Marsden, as note 88 above, at p. 253.
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that the EC communications regulation, as it stands, conforms to the law of the WTO
and the commitments of the EC and its Member States made in the frame of the WTO
Agreements.
The EC regulatory framework has however evolved in the last decade: building
upon the successful transition from monopoly to competition in the
telecommunications sector, it has adapted to meet the new challenges posed by the
rapid development of communications technologies and markets and the correlated
process of convergence. In response to these novel developments, the 2002
framework for electronic communications formulated, among other things, three
new fundamental principles embodied in the (i) separation of content and networks
regulation; (ii) alignment of sector specific rules with antitrust methodology,
including a mechanism for withdrawal of sectoral rules and (iii) introduction of
technological neutrality. As evident from the overview of the WTO
telecommunications rules, these principles cannot (yet) be appropriately reflected at
the international level. If the EC framework follows its path of evolution,295 the gap
between EC communications law and the WTO rules is likely to increase, especially
with regard to the obligations of the Community under the Reference Paper for
``major suppliers''.
To conclude in the context of the more general discussion of governance of
international telecommunications, convergence as a phenomenon and an ongoing
process and the ubiquitous digitization make it impossible to maintain the traditional
criteria, and calls for adjustments in communications regulation. In the WTO context,
however, the very structure of GATS may constrain the available choices because of the
bottom-up approach of the Agreement,296 under which the substance of the
commitments is contained in the individual schedules of the Members and the
GATS applies only to those sectors tabled therein. The unreliable classification list, the
multiple sub-headings and their different interpretation in different Members'
schedules of commitments provide rather unsuitable bases for adjustment to
convergence and the introduction of technological neutrality.
Clearer definitions and appropriate distinctions between networks, services and
content, coherence in the interpretation and the application of the Reference Paper,
and most importantly, a greater willingness to commit to a definite adaptation are
needed. This is not to say that the WTO should necessarily regulate competition and
harmonize all rules within the communications markets of its Members since its role as
an international trade forum is different.297 It should, above all, try to observe and
reflect the contemporary developments occurring in the markets for electronic
295 Which is very likely. See European Commission, On the review of the EU regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services, COM(2006) 334 final, 29 June 2006.
296 Jackson, as note 16 above, at p. 308.
297 See von Bogdany, note 157.
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communications.298 Although it has been wisely said that, ``[i]t cannot be helped, it is as
it should be, that the law is behind the times'',299 the law should at least try to keep up.
298 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in
the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), 999±1046.
299 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, US Supreme Court, 1841±1935.
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